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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
by
Iván M. Rodríguez, Jr.
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Edward R. Lawrence, Major Professor
In this dissertation, I focus my research on some of the economically significant and
current open problems in international finance, specifically the relationship between Credit
Default Swaps (CDS) on sovereign debt, the importance of fundamental dyadic distances on
the initiation and completion of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, and the impact of
domestic and transnational terrorism on cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
In the first essay, we study the relationship between sovereign debt ratings and the infor-
mation contained in CDS spreads regarding the credit risk of the reference entity. Using data
for 54 countries over a twelve-year period, we find that the variation in average sovereign rat-
ings in a given year can be explained by average CDS spreads over the previous three years.
In a horse race between CDS spreads and sovereign ratings, we find that CDS spread changes
can predict sovereign events while rating changes cannot.
In the second essay, we study how dyadic distance influences the initiation, completion,
and duration of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Using a sample of 173,616 cross-
border deals announced between 1970 and 2016, we find evidence that cross-country cul-
tural, institutional, geographical, religious, and language differences, all play a deciding role
in the initiation of mergers and acquisitions. The completion of acquisitions is independent
of cultural factors, but largely depends on differences in economy size, language, religion, and
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bureaucracy of the acquiring and target countries. Finally, the duration of deals is influenced
by idiosyncratic factors only.
In the third essay, we study whether incidents of domestic and transnational terrorism
impact the propensity of firms to acquire cross-border firms. We adopt a theoretical model
to show that high levels of terrorism in the target countries are associated with lower cross-
border acquisition flows. Empirically, we exploit the exogenous variation induced by differ-
ences in genetic diversity, ethnic fractionalization, and religious fractionalization between
acquirer and target countries. Our results show that an target from a country with lower
terrorist incidents than the acquirer country are associated with more cross-border mergers
and acquisitions. 
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1 Measuring Sovereign Risk
The Eurozone debt crisis that began in late 2009 has brought the stability of sovereign debt
back into the focus of academics and investors. The most recent literature on the cost of
sovereign defaults has found that debt restructurings are costly to both the issuers and in-
vestors. Cruces and Trebesch (2013) study 180 cases over the 1978-2010 period and find that
over $8.29 trillion in sovereign debt has been restructured, with an average cost to investors,
or haircut, of 37%. Their evidence shows that haircuts have risen substantially, with the av-
erage haircut increasing to 50% over the 1998-2010 period.1
The high costs associated with debt restructurings and defaults have forced investors to
find ways to assess the likelihood of these events. Historically, sovereign debt ratings were re-
lied upon almost exclusively by investors in guiding their investment decisions and by policy-
makers in financial legislations. This dependence on sovereign ratings means that sovereign
rating downgrades negatively affect capital markets and the real economy per se, which in
turn affects a firm’s ability to raise capital through the debt channel. Almeida, Cunha, Fer-
reira, and Restrepo (2017) show that sovereign rating downgrades lead to a reduction in in-
vestment of about 10% and a 2% reduction in debt for firms in the downgraded country, and
the cash holdings of firms decrease substantially in the year of downgrade. These changes are
solely due to the sovereign downgrade and not with any changes in the fundamentals of the
firm. Our finding that changes in CDS spreads can predict negative sovereign rating events
up to seven months before they occur will help firms make timely decisions in alleviating
their capital concerns.
Rating agencies are conscious of their impact on the economy and therefore point to rat-
ing accuracy and stability as main considerations in their methodologies (see, e.g., Cantor
1In addition to the high costs associated with restructurings and defaults, there has been a substantial abso-
lute and relative increase in sovereign debt since the end of the crisis (see Dobbs, Lund,Woetzel, &Mutafchieva,
2015). There is also evidence that large sovereign debt levels can negatively affect future GDP growth (see, e.g.,
Reinhart, Reinhart, & Rogoff, 2012).
1
& Mann, 2007). As noted by Altman and Rijken (2006) rating agencies use a through-the-
cycle approach, considering only permanent changes in an issuer’s financial health. While
this approachmay seem prudent at first glance, it conflicts with two othermain objectives for
ratings agencies: rating timeliness and performance in predicting defaults (Altman&Rijken,
2006). Kiff, Kisser, and Schumacher (2013) find that although through-the-cycle ratings are
initially stable, they suffer from inferior performance in predicting future defaults due to the
smoothed ratings generated by their policy to delay rating changes.2 They also show that
through-the-cycle ratings are prone to large downgrades of several notches when changes
do occur; this can lead to market disruptions and dangerous fire-sales. By contrast, indi-
cators that focus on the current condition of the issuer (called point-in-time assessments of
risk) may not be as persistent as through-the-cycle ratings; however, they are much better at
predicting sovereign defaults and do not lead to these second round liquidity effects caused
by large rating changes. We show that CDS spreads are one of the sovereign risk measures
available to investors on a timely basis.3
Over the last two decades, CDS have become a major instrument used by investors to
insure themselves against the risk of credit events, and they have increasingly become an im-
portant area of academic study.4 In an efficient market, the CDS spread should appropriately
price and insure against the potential credit risk of the reference entity. Theoretical literature
has shown that CDS spreads are a function of both a risk-free rate and a risk-neutral measure
2The stable rating scheme is also supported by the relatively small number of rating categories employed
by rating agencies, giving rating agencies more flexibility in timing their changes. Goel and Thakor (2015) show
that coarse ratings can endogenously arise from an environment inwhich increased competition between rating
agencies incentivizes them to inflate ratings but still try tomaintain unbiasedness. They also show that lowering
coarseness can improve social welfare.
3We acknowledge that whereas the CDS is directly linked to the probability of sovereign default, the objec-
tives of credit rating agencies are not limited to the prediction of sovereign credit default. Apart from deciding
on the entity’s creditworthiness, ratings have been embedded in regulations.
4See the survey by Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) for a discussion on the extant CDS
literature.
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of default intensity, which can intuitively be thought of as a risk-adjusted loss (Longstaff,
Mithal, & Neis, 2005; Pan & Singleton, 2008; Duffie & Singleton, 1997).5 This theoretical
framework led the early literature to assume CDS spreads as pure measures of default. How-
ever, more recent empirical literature has acknowledged additional factors that determine
CDS spread dynamics. In particular, global factors (Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, & Singleton,
2011; Pan & Singleton, 2008) and macroeconomic and local factors (Remolona, Scatigna,
& Wu, 2008; Caceres, Segoviano Basurto, & Guzzo, 2010; Aizenman, Hutchison, & Jinjarak,
2013; Lee, Naranjo, & Sirmans, 2015) have also been found to be determinants of CDS spreads.
Most attempts to explain the determinants of sovereign debt ratings focus on macroeco-
nomic and political variables. In the first study that systematically investigates the determi-
nants of sovereign debt ratings, Cantor and Packer (1996) examine the power of eight lagged
macroeconomic variables in explaining the ratings by Moody’s Investor Services (Moody’s)
and Standard and Poor’s (S&P). They find that six factors — per capita income, GDP growth,
inflation, external debt, the level of economic development, and default history — play an
important role in explaining sovereign debt ratings.
More recently, Maltritz and Molchanov (2013) examine more than 30 factors that the
literature has identified as important determinants in assessing sovereign default risk. They
conclude that the political and governance factors are not important while recent default and
total debt relative toGDP are the significantmacroeconomic factors, which is consistent with
what prior studies have found. These studies highlight the backward-looking nature of credit
ratings. Themacroeconomic variables used in rating sovereign debt are released at infrequent
5More formally, the CDS spread, s, is
s =
E
(
w
∫ T
0 λt e
−∫ t0 rsλs d s d t)
E
(∫ T
0 e
−∫ t0 rsλs d s d t) ,
where w is the recovery rate; λt is the default intensity or hazard rate; and rt if the risk-free rate. This
equation was developed by Longstaff et al. (2005) following the Duffie and Singleton (1997) framework, which
was extended to sovereign CDS spreads by Pan and Singleton (2008).
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intervals and are accounting-type indicators, which contributes to the slow evolution seen in
sovereign debt ratings.
The literature on the determinants of CDS spreads and ratings shows that macroeco-
nomic variables are important in explaining the dynamics of both CDS spreads and rat-
ings, albeit on different time-scales. CDS spread changes reflect real-time changes in these
macroeconomic variables, while rating agencies may take several months to reflect these
changes. Since there are large delays in the measurement and disclosure of the macroeco-
nomic variables, we argue that investors are better off using CDS spreads in lieu of ratings.
The lead-lag structure between CDS spreads and ratings and the fact that the same factors
price both CDS and ratings indicate that CDS spreads could be an explanatory factor of rat-
ings. Additionally, it is not outside the scope of imagination that rating agencies themselves
could be using CDS as a market summary variable in their rating methodologies.
In this essay, we investigate the viability of CDS spreads as a substitute for sovereign debt
ratings in predicting sovereign defaults. We find CDS spreads to be significantly associated
with average ratings and — after controlling for invariant time and country effects — CDS
spreads subsume the macroeconomic controls that have been proposed as determinants of
ratings. We find that the explanatory power of the model for the determinants of ratings
increases with the addition of CDS spreads, that CDS spread alone can explain 45% of the
variability of sovereign debt ratings compared to the 40% explained by macroeconomic vari-
ables, and that CDS spreads subsume the explanatory power for every year in our sample.6
In further robustness tests we regress CDS spreads as dependent variable and lagged changes
in ratings as independent variables controlling for agency, country, and time fixed effects.
We do not find any influence of rating changes on CDS spreads. Our tests show that CDS
spread changes predict rating changes but rating changes do not have any predictive power
in explaining CDS changes.
6We use the macroeconomic variables in Cantor and Packer (1996) as controls in our study.
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The existing studies that explore the connection between CDS markets and debt ratings
have either concerned themselves with corporate CDS markets or tests of market efficiency.
In particular, they have investigated the question of whether CDS markets anticipate ratings
at short horizons, implying that if CDSmarkets anticipate ratings then they are efficient. Hull,
Predescu, and White (2004) analyze the extent to which corporate CDS markets anticipate
credit rating events, finding that there is anticipation of negative events by the markets and
CDS spreads fully reflect the new information one day after the negative event. However,
they find no significant results for positive events. In a similar vein, Ismailescu and Kazemi
(2010) conducted an event study on the reaction of CDS spreads to ratings announcements in
emerging sovereign markets. In contrast to Hull et al. (2004), they find that CDS markets are
unreactive to negative events and have strong reactions to positive events. They additionally
find that CDS spread changes in one month can predict negative rating events in the next
month.
In contrast to Ismailescu andKazemi (2010), who study amonthly change in CDS spread,
our results suggest that predictability exists at longer lags than solely one month.7 Therefore,
we investigate the possibility of one-month CDS changes to predict sovereign debt rating
events m months into the future. We find that one-month CDS changes retain their predic-
tive ability up to seven months solely for negative rating events. Our results are robust to
concerns about reverse causation.8
7They study the ability of the prior month’s change in CDS spread to predict rating changes. However, no
mention is made of any additional tests or looking at longer horizons.
8Theremay be some apprehension that the results may be contaminated by successive credit rating changes
that can occur within seven to 12months of each other, i.e., a reverse causality concern. We address this concern
by restricting our sample to rating events in which there were no other rating events in the previous 24 months.
Our results exhibit patterns consistent with our baseline setting. Our results are also not driven by differences
in investment grade, differences in the relative stasis of CDS spreads, outliers with many rating changes, or the
rarity of rating events. These results are available from the authors upon request.
5
Toascertain if CDS spreads are a better predictor of negative sovereign events than sovereign
debt ratings, we run a horse race between CDS spreads and ratings and directly test their
utility to investors as such. Our results show that CDS spread changes can predict negative
sovereign events while rating changes contain no ability to predict these events.9 The pre-
dictability of events using CDS spreads is stronger when Moody’s and S&P have a one-notch
difference or more. This shows that CDS spreads are able to capture additional informa-
tion than ratings. Our findings are consistent with recent work which shows that sovereign
CDS spreads can predict other financial variables (Xiao, Yan, & Zhang, 2017) and with the
literature documenting the inability of ratings to predict sovereign crises (Sy, 2004).
Our essay contributes to the literature in several important ways. Firstly, by studying the
cross-sectional joint-distribution of sovereign credit ratings and CDS spreads, we document
new stylized facts about the relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and ratings. We
find evidence that one-month CDS spread changes can predict negative rating changes up
to seven months in advance. Secondly, we provide quantitative evidence of the superior-
ity of CDS spreads relative to ratings in predicting sovereign events. Our findings will aide
investors and managers in determining whether a change in a country’s rating will occur,
helping them manage their portfolios or corporate policies. We give a leading indicator of
rating downgrades and sovereign events that they can use to hedge against the real economic
risks from sovereign downgrades.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows: Section 1.1 formulates the research questions;
Section 1.2 describes the data; Section 1.3 presents and explains the results; and Section 1.4
concludes.
9We are grateful to the anonymous referee who suggested this direct test of our hypothesis and studying
agency disagreement.
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1.1 Research Questions
In this section we show how contemporaneous, or forward-looking, macroeconomic factors
are related to CDS spreads. We then concentrate on the backward-looking nature of rat-
ings. Lastly, we examine the link between CDS and ratings, which allows us to formulate our
research questions and highlight our contributions to the literature.
1.1.1 The Determinants of CDS Spreads
The CDS determinant literature we discussed in the introduction reinforces the intuitive
idea that sovereign CDS spreads, which are the prices investors pay to insure themselves
against sovereign default, are based on the probability of default, global factors, and local
macroeconomic conditions of the reference entity. In particular, prior literature highlights
the forward-looking nature of CDS spreads where the spread in period t can be expressed as
st = f (Etλ,EtG ,Et M), (1)
where Et is the expectation at time t ; λ is the hazard rate; G is a vector of global factors; and
M is a vector of local macroeconomic factors. When coupled with the high frequency avail-
ability of CDS spread data compared to macroeconomic data, CDS spreads make a highly
viable candidate measure of sovereign default.
1.1.2 Sovereign Debt Ratings
The literature on determinants of ratings discussed in the introduction highlights one key
aspect about sovereign debt ratings, the backward-looking nature of the factors and macroe-
conomic measures implying that we can denote ratings as
rt = f (λt−k ,Gt−k , Mt−k ). (2)
In other words, the rating at t is a function of past realizations of the probability of default,
global factors, and localmacroeconomic factors. These variables are available at low frequen-
7
cies, whichmeans that ratings evolve slowly. Cantor andMann (2007) argue that the stability
(i.e., slow evolution and low variability) is an important feature of ratings. They also point
out that the high variability in market-based measures may increase accuracy, but at the cost
of stability.
In this essay we exploit the lag-lead structure between CDS spreads, ratings, and their
common determinants to model ratings as a function of lagged CDS spreads. We can sub-
stitute Equation (1) into Equation (2) to show that we can model ratings as a function of past
spreads,
rt = f (st−k ) (3)
This specification equates various fundamental factors that drive the dynamics of ratings
and spreads. We argue that CDS spreads are a viable alternative to ratings and can be used
by investors in their financial decision making. In addition, since CDS spreads are sum-
mary variables of macroeconomic and global factors, using them could help reduce the large
uncertainty involved in modeling sovereign debt ratings.
1.1.3 CDS and Sovereign Debt Ratings
The literature that studies the relationship between CDS spreads and financial markets pri-
marily links CDS spreads to market efficiency.10 For example, Lee, Naranjo, and Sirmans
(2014) find that CDS momentum profits exist even though corporate CDS markets are rel-
atively efficient. Market efficiency is also tested by studying the effects of rating events on
the CDS markets. The first to study this aspect of CDS markets were Hull et al. (2004), who
analyzed the extent to which corporate CDS markets anticipate credit rating events. They
10There has been at least one attempt to tie CDS spreads and ratings together in a theoretical framework.
Li, Li, and Yang (2014) develop a rating based continuous time model of sovereign credit risk, which captures
both the cross-sectional and time-series properties of sovereign credit spreads. While unrelated to our work,
this paper highlights the tight link that can be discerned between CDS spreads and sovereign debt ratings.
There have also been efforts from a regulatory perspective in using corporate CDS as an alternative to ratings
(Flannery, Houston, & Partnoy, 2010).
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find that there is anticipation of negative events by the markets and that CDS spreads fully
reflect the new information one day after the negative event. However, there were no signifi-
cant results for positive events. Similarly, Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) conducted an event
study on the reaction of CDS spreads to ratings announcements in 22 emerging sovereign
markets.11 In contrast to Hull et al. (2004), they find that markets are unreactive to negative
events while markets have strong reactions to positive events. This is due to different reac-
tions between investment grade and non-investment grade reference entities, with invest-
ment grade entities having strong reactions to negative rating events and non-investment
grade entities having a strong response to positive rating events. They also find that CDS
spread changes in one month can predict negative rating events in the next month.
Note that while Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) also studies the information contained
in lagged sovereign CDS spreads, our study differs in several key aspects. Ismailescu and
Kazemi (2010) study the efficacy of a one-month change in spread in predicting a negative
rating event by the end of the following month solely for S&P. In contrast, we study how far
back one-month spreads retain their predictive ability for rating events for both S&P and
Moody’s. Furthermore, we are the first to study and directly test the ability of sovereign rat-
ings and CDS spreads in predicting sovereign events. Our methodology is therefore broader
in scope, allowing us to show the extent of the predictability and contrast the approaches
taken by the biggest rating agencies.
1.1.4 Research Questions
In Section 1.1.1, we have discussed that CDS spreads are functions of forward looking de-
fault rates, global factors, and local macroeconomic factors. In Section 1.1.2, we highlight
the fact that the literature implies sovereign debt ratings are functions of backward looking
11Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes (2012) find similar results to Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) for 24 developed
E.U. member reference entities.
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macroeconomic measures. The lead-lag structure between the determinants of ratings and
the determinants of CDS spreads allows us to model rating as functions of lagged spreads
and investigate the viability of CDS spreads to substitute for sovereign debt ratings. This
then naturally leads us to our research questions: Can CDS spreads explain the variation in
ratings? Could we identify the number of months (m) that one-month CDS changes have
the ability to predict sovereign rating events? And between CDS spreads and debt ratings,
which is better at predicting sovereign events?
1.2 Data
Our analysis takes place at two different levels of aggregation: (i) we use annual data to study
the explanatory power of CDS spreads and (ii) monthly data to study the predictability of
ratings using CDS spreads. For our annual analysis we merge the ratings data, CDS spread
data, and macroeconomic data. We get an unbalanced panel data set from 2005 to 2016 with
54 countries and a total of 543 observations. We continue to work with the 54 countries in
our monthly dataset over the same time-period.
We download the data on sovereign debt ratings from Bloomberg. The data includes
both Moody’s and S&P’s letter credit ratings and their respective credit outlooks. We convert
the ratings, including the credit outlook, into a numerical scale, or comprehensive credit
rating (CCR). Rating agencies announce credit outlooks to indicate potential ratings in the
medium term. The credit outlooks take on the values of -0.5 for a negative outlook and +0.5
for a positive outlook. We follow the CCR convention as in Cantor and Packer (1996) for the
annual analysis and Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) for the monthly analysis.
The CCR for the annual data ranges from B3/B- = 1 to Aaa/AAA = 16. We use the end-
of-year CCR in the annual analysis. The CCR for the monthly data ranges from -1 to 17,
with selective default (”SD”) as the lowest and AAA/Aaa as the highest. We used the end-
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of-month CCR in our monthly analysis. When needed, we measure each country’s average
rating by taking the mean of the CCR from each rating agency.
The data for the CDS spreads are also fromBloomberg. For our analysis we use 5-year, US
dollar denominated contracts.12 In Table 1 we present the summary statistics of our monthly
CDS data for each country used in our analysis. Our final sample has 54 reference entities,
with mean log CDS spreads ranging from a high of 6.87 log bps. for Venezuela to a low of
2.43 log bps. for Sweden.
In our annual analysis we test for the relationship between annual rating changes and the
average three year CDS spread one year before the rating change, cd s1:3. Our variable of
interest, cd s1:3, is the natural log of the three-year arithmetic mean of the CDS spread. This
variable is constructed followingCantor andPacker (1996) and is designed tomitigate against
simultaneity concerns and the effects of business cycles. The data on the macroeconomic
variables is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database, which
is supplemented when necessary with the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic
Outlooks data andwith theWorld Bank’sQuarterly External Debt Statistics SDDS database.13
The control variables we employ are constructed following Cantor and Packer (1996). In
Table 2 we provide descriptive statistics for the key variable of interest, denoted cd s1:3 and
the vector of macroeconomic controls, denoted X .
For ourmonthly analysis, we construct a database withmonthly CDS spread changes and
monthly rating changes. The monthly rating changes are computed as the difference in the
end-of-month CCRs. We compute the monthly CDS spread change as the one-month dif-
12The 5-year CDS contract is the most highly traded and liquid contract. Since we are interested in the
implications of the relations between CDS and ratings for investors, we solely use this contract.
13We use the most recent default dates (August 2014) compiled by Cruces and Trebesch (2013) to create
our default history indicator. The sample covers the full universe of sovereign debt restructurings with foreign
commercial creditors (banks and bondholders) from 1970 until 2010. Based on certain selection criteria, they
identify 182 sovereign debt restructurings by 68 countries since 1978 (no restructurings occurred between 1970
and 1977). We supplement the database using data for 2015 and 2016 from Beers and Mavalwalla (2017).
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ference in the log of CDS spread. Following Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), if rating changes
occur in two consecutive months, we eliminate the month that immediately follows the first
rating change.
Since the number of sovereign defaults after 2000 is too small to analyze in any statisti-
cally meaningful way, we use the J.P. Morgan Global emerging market bond indices (EMBI)
blended sovereign bond spreads to create a proxy for defaults.14 Following Sy (2004), we de-
fine a negative sovereign event to occur if a country’s EMBI sovereign bond spread change is
greater than 3 standard deviations from its mean. Although we are able to find EMBI bonds
spreads for 64 countries, when we combine the sovereign event data with our monthly CDS
spread and ratings data, we are left with data on 26 countries for our analysis.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Ratings and Credit Default Spreads: OLS Estimates
Baseline In Panel A of Figure 1 we plot cd s1:3 as a function of time. We observe an increase
in cd s1:3 starting around the start of the financial crisis and peaking with the Eurozone debt
crisis. In Panel (B) of Figure 1 we plot average rating between Moody’s and S&P as functions
of time. Panel (B) counterintuitively documents a small but perceptible bump in overall
average rating in our sample, even though a large number of downgrades occurred between
2010 and 2012. Panel C of Figure 1 shows the cross-sectionalOLS regression of average ratings
on cd s1:3 for each country in our sample and the pooledOLS regression of our overall sample.
We find that countries with higher CDS spreads over the prior three years have substantially
lower average ratings.
14Although Cruces and Trebesch (2013) document 24 countries with sovereign defaults between 2000 and
2013, we only have CDS data for 5 of the countries.
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To substantiate the evidence in Figure 1, Table 3 reports the results from the following
reduced-form OLS regressions
rkt =α+β · cd s1:3,kt +ukt ,
rkt =α+β · cd s1:3,kt +γX ′kt +ukt ,
rkt =β · cd s1:3,kt +γX ′kt +αk +τt +ukt .
(4)
where rkt is the rating in year t for country k ; cd s1:3,kt is the log average CDS spread over
the previous three years for country k in year t ; X kt is the vector of macroeconomic controls
for country k in year t ; αk controls for fixed country characteristics; τt controls for the time-
varying factors common across all countries; and ukt is a random error term. The coefficient
of interest is β, the effect of CDS spread on ratings. Since bias in the standard errors is intro-
duced when there is serial correlation within countries and when there is spatial correlation
across countries within years, we cluster the standard errors by country and year following
Petersen (2008).
Column (1) of Table 3 presents the results of a univariate specification and no controls
[line 1 of Equation (4)]. Column (2) presents the results with the macroeconomic controls
but without cd s1:3. Column (3) presents the regression with both cd s1:3 and controls [line
2 of Equation (4)]. Comparing across these three specifications, we observe a strong neg-
ative relationship between rkt and cd s1:3,kt . However, the results may be contaminated by
unobserved heterogeneity. To mitigate against this concern, we include country fixed ef-
fects to control for time-invariant country characteristics and year fixed effects to capture
unobservable global characteristics (Gormley & Matsa, 2014).
Column (4) of Table 3 presents the results of the fixed-effects specification with no con-
trols. Column (5) presents the results with the macroeconomic controls and without cd s1:3.
Column (6) includes cd s1:3, all controls, and fixed effects [line 3 of Equation (4)]. Compar-
ing across these three specifications, we find that the strong negative relationship between
rkt and cd s1:3,kt remains.
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The R2 of the regression inColumn (4) indicates that about 45% of the variation in ratings
is explained by cd s1:3 and it subsumes the explanatory power of the regression with all five
controls in Column (5). This key fact supports the framework summarized by Equation (3)
andmotivates the sufficiency of CDS spreads in predicting sovereign rating events. Note that
the explanatory power increases when both cd s1:3 and the macroeconomic control variables
are included in the regressions. This means that even though CDS spreads explains more of
the variation in ratings than the macroeconomic controls per ipsum, there is still an incre-
mental advantage in using both CDS spreads and macroeconomic variables in explaining a
countries sovereign debt rating.
We also run cross-sectional regressions for each year in our sample to see how the rela-
tionship between cd s1:3 and average ratings has evolved over time. The results of this ex-
ercise is presented in Figure 2. We observe that CDS spreads are significantly negatively
associated with average ratings throughout our sample period and the coefficient of interest
shifted even further from zero after 2009. The explanatory power of CDS spreads was high
at the beginning of our sample period, fell during the Eurozone crisis, and has rebounded in
importance. Throughout the sample period, we find the power of cd s1:3 to explain the cross-
country variation in average ratings to be higher relative to the macroeconomic controls the
prior literature has found to be important.
Robustness While these results are striking, it can be argued that they are being driven by
the fact that we used level CDS spreads, and not spread changes. That is, our results may
be driven by the possible non-stationarity of CDS spreads. Some might argue that if CDS
spreads are non-stationary then the results employing level CDS spreads may be spurious
and differencing the spreads may help alleviate the statistical problems. However, the theo-
retical underpinnings of CDS spreads are not intrinsically described by processes that display
drifts which would imply non-stationarity (Doshi, Jacobs, Ericsson, & Turnbull, 2013). Addi-
tionally, the impact of non-stationary series on panel model estimates may not be as central
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as in pure time-series analysis (Kao, 1999; Phillips & Moon, 1999).15 Regardless, to alleviate
these concerns about the spuriosness of our results we test for stationarity using two related
panel unit root tests: the test of Levin, Lin, and James Chu (2002) (LLC) and the test of Im,
Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS)
Both LLC and IPS are extensions of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test to a panel setting.
The LLC tests the null that all the cross-sections have a unit root by assuming that all cross-
sections share the same autoregressive parameter. The IPS is not as restrictive as the LLC, as
it allows for heterogeneity of the unit root coefficient across panels. More formally, we con-
sider that log CDS spreads (si t ) for a sample of N cross-sections (countries) over T periods
(months) is generated by
si t = (1−ϕi )µi +ϕi yi t−1 +εi t
∆si t =αi +βi yi t−1 +εi t ,
(5)
where αi = (1−ϕi )µi and βi = −(1−ϕi ). We test the null hypothesis of unit roots ϕi = 1
for all i , which is equivalent to testing βi = 0 for all i against the alternative βi < 0, i =
1, . . . , N1; β j = 0, j = N1, . . . , N . This general formulation of the hypothesis by IPS allows for
βi to differ across groups and subsumes the homogenous alternative hypothesis (βi =β< 0
for all i ) of LLC.
Since Levin et al. (2002) recommendusing their procedure formoderate-sized panels and
requires a strongly balanced panel where the asymptotics assume N /T → 0, for the unit root
testswe keep only those countrieswith availableCDS spread data for our entire sample period
of interest. Out of 54 countries we are left with a balanced sample of N = 12 (countries) and
T = 144 (months). To control for bias due to autocorrelation Equation (5) can be rewritten
15See page 273ff of Baltagi (2008) for a survey on panel unit root tests. He notes, ”Unlike the single time
series spurious regression literature, the panel data spurious regression estimates give a consistent estimate of the
true value of the parameter as both N and T tend to infinity. This is because, the panel estimator averages across
individuals and the information in the independent cross-section data in the panel leads to a stronger overall signal
than the pure time series case.”
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as
∆si t =αi +βi yi t−1 +
p∑
L=1
θi L∆si t−L +εi t . (6)
The tests derived when controlling for autocorrelation are denoted as t∗
δ
(LLC) and w t̄ (IPS).
Table 4 presents the results of the LLC and IPS unit root tests. Column (1) and (3)
present the results for the LLC and IPS unit root test respectively without removing the
cross-sectional means. The results reject the null of a unit root. Additionally, O’Connell
(1998) highlights the importance of controlling for cross-sectional dependence, showing that
tests for panel unit roots suffer from significant size distortion in the presence of correlation
among contemporaneous cross-sectional error terms. To control for cross-sectional depen-
dence, we remove the cross-sectional means and report our results in Columns (2) and (4).
Again, the results reject the null of a unit root. We find that the tests are suggestive of the sta-
tionarity of monthly log CDS spreads and imply that the results presented in Table 3 are not
spurious. As a robustness test of the reduced-form results in Table 3, we re-run the regres-
sion for the subsample of countries that are included in the unit root tests in Table 4 when we
limit the sample until the end of 2014, which yields us 21 countries with complete CDS data
for each month. These results in Table 5 show that the relationship between ratings and CDS
spreads is even stronger for this subsample, as evidenced by the increase in the explanatory
power.
Subsamples In order to see which subsamples are driving our results, we run the specifi-
cations in Equation (4) on subsamples partitioned by continent: Europe, the Americas, and
Asia & Oceania.16 The results in Table (6) show that the relationship is strongest in the Eu-
ropean subsample. The coefficient of interest is negative and significant, and the R2 of the
regression in Column (4) indicates that about 40% of the variation in ratings is explained
16We have 8 observations from Oceania and 14 from Africa. We group Asia and Oceania together due to
their similarities. We do not study the African subsample in depth due to the small sample size.
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by cd s1:3 and subsumes the explanatory power of the regression with all five controls in
Column (5). The America subsample still retains the negative and significant coefficient of
interest, but the macroeconomic controls alone have greater explanatory power than cd s1:3.
The Asian & Oceania subsample still retains the negative and but is insignificant and the
explanatory power is the weakest.
One interesting aspect is that there is a large variation in CDS spreads for countries that
are AAA rated, as can be seen in Panel C of Figure 1. In other words, there are a large number
of countries that rating agencies certify as the most credit-worthy with a high-price to insure
against sovereign default. In order to study this disagreement between CDS spreads and
rating agencies, in Figure 3 we plot the CDS spreads and average ratings for countries that
were rated AAA at some point and who’s ratings are larger than predicted by our model in
column (1) of Table 3 for negative rating events. From this figure, we can graphical checkwhat
will happen when ratings and CDS disagree with each other. This figure seems to indicate
that if a country has high credit rating but the CDS spreads are abnormally high, suggesting
high sovereign risk, then ratings adjust and move towards CDS spreads. This tantalizing
graphical evidence will be studied statistically in the next section.
We conclude that the average CDS spread over the previous three years is strongly corre-
lated to average ratings at the end of the following year. Our results are statistically significant,
economically significant, and robust. Our evidence shows that CDS spreads are a major de-
terminant of sovereign debt ratings and motivate the use of CDS spreads in predicting rating
changes.
1.3.2 Predicting Rating Events
Baseline Results. The results in the Section 1.3.1 confirm the correlational structure be-
tween ratings and lagged CDS spreads and additionally highlight the importance of CDS
spreads by itself in explaining the variation of ratings. In this section we estimate the num-
ber of months (m) that one-month CDS changes retain the ability to predict sovereign rating
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events. We test the predictability of rating events using lagged changes in CDS spreads using
the following logistic regression models:
p
(
1−∆ri ,t
)
=G (α+β∆si ,t−m)
p
(
1+∆ri ,t
)
=G (α+β∆si ,t−m) , (7)
where 1−/+∆ri ,t is an indicator variable that is equal to unity when the difference in the CCR
at the end of month t and t −1 is negative/positive and zero if there is no change. In other
words, the control group comprises of observations where there were no rating changes while
the treatment group is comprised of observation with negative/positive rating events. Our
independent variable of interest, ∆st−m , is the one-month difference of the log CDS spread
lagged back m months; p is the probability of success; and G(·) is the logistic link function.
Tables 7 and 8 presents the results of these pooled logistic regressions. In Table 7 we
model rating changes as the dependent variable and the results show that rating changes
are positively related to CDS spread changes and significant for up to seven months. To
explore the results in more depth, in Table 8 we differentiate between positive changes and
negative changes in ratings. We find that one-month log CDS differences are able to predict
negative rating changes up to seven months in advance. The coefficients are positive and
statistically significant at the one percent level. The coefficients for positive rating changes
have the predicted negative sign and are statistically significant up to three months.17
Next we quantify the cumulative change that seems to trigger a rating event. Using the
estimated period of predictability for negative events, we measure the probability of a rating
change given various “buckets” of log CDS spread changes over the seven-month period. The
probability is estimated as follows:
p
(
1−∆ri ,t
)
=G (α+∑ Ii t ,L:U ) (8)
17The results hold when we partition between Moody’s and S&P.
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where 1−/+∆ri ,t is an indicator variable that is equal to unity when the difference in theCCR at the
end ofmonth t and t−1 is negative and zero if there is no change; and IL:U is an indicator that
is equal to unity if the rolling seven-month cumulative change in log CDS spread is within the
lower bound L and upper boundU . The results of this estimation are reported in Table 9. We
find a substantial increase in the probability of a negative rating change if there is a change
of more than 40% in the past seven months, which increases almost monotonically as the
cumulative log CDS spread increases. More specifically, a change in the cumulative log CDS
spread of 40% is associated with a 74% chance of a negative rating event, which increases
almost monotonically to a 93% chance of a negative rating event for cumulative spreads of
200%.
Robustness Tests. We run the following robustness tests to ascertain the validity of our
results.
In the previous section we studied the predictability of CDS spreads using a logit speci-
fication. However as Shumway (2001) points out, there may be some issues with this speci-
fication. Logit models do not account for time explicitly and cannot account for censoring
(when an observation is no longer being observed). For this reason, we re-estimate our re-
gression using a Cox proportional hazard model. One additional advantage in this method
is that it includes each country year pair as a separate observation, thereby allowing us to
exploit more of the data and produce more precise and robust estimates. The results in Ta-
ble 10 are similar to our baseline results: negative events are predictable up to to 8 months in
advance and there is no consistent pattern for positive rating changes.
We also study the ability of CDS spreads to predict the size of rating change using OLS
with fixed effects for country, year, and rating agency. We report these results in Table 11.
These results again confirm the initial pattern of interest: negative rating changes can be
predicted up to seven months in advance and there is no pattern for positive rating changes.
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Additionally, the issue of reverse causality may arise in this context. It can be argued that
rating events could influence CDS spreads, and that our methodology is capturing the ef-
fect of rating events and not CDS spreads per se. In order to alleviate simultaneity concerns,
we run the following robustness tests. Firstly, we run an OLS regression with CDS spread
changes as the dependent variable and lagged negative and positive rating change indica-
tors as the independent variables controlling for agency, country, and year fixed effects. We
present the results of this exercise in Table 12. These results show no discernible pattern of
predictability. Secondly, we take a more direct approach to study whether there is any in-
fluence from rating changes to CDS spread changes. We accomplish this by isolating rating
events where there were no other rating events in the previous 24 months which allows us
to mitigate the effects that rating changes have on CDS spreads. The results in Table 13 are
qualitatively similar to our baseline. The coefficient of interest is statistically significant up
to 4 months before negative rating events while statistically insignificant for positive rating
events. This shows that that predictability appears to exist at least up to 4 months before
negative rating events.
Finally, we run another robustness test to see whether our results are being driven by
countries with a large number of rating upgrade and rating downgrades.18 We remove any
country which is in the upper quintile of rating upgrades and rating downgrades and rerun
our baseline logit regression. The results in Table 14 are again qualitatively similar to our
baseline, which indicates that there is no discernible effect coming from outliers.
Graphical Evidence. To tackle the question of whether CDS spread changes truly predict
rating changes over and above the evidence in the previous section, we plot the evolution of
CDS spreads around long-run windows surrounding rating changes inspired by the recent
18For downgrades, these countries are Cyprus (CY), Spain (ES), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE),
Italy (IT), Latvia (LT), Portugal (PT), Slovenia (SI), and Ukraine (UA). For upgrades, these countries are Bul-
garia (BG), Brazil (BR), Indonesia (ID), Peru (PE), Philippines (PH), Romania (RO), Russia, (RU), and Slovakia
(SK).
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literature that has studied event studies in CDS markets (e.g., Ismailescu & Kazemi, 2010;
Chava, Ganduri, & Ornthanalai, 2016).
Figure 4 plots the reaction of monthly CDS spreads before and after rating changes. CDS
spreads precipitate both negative and positive rating events. CDS spreads increase about 50%
before a negative rating event and stabilize afterwards with a total spread change of about
55% in the 18-month window surrounding the event. CDS spreads also show a tendency
to anticipate positive rating events, with about a 20% decrease in spreads before the event
month and stabilize afterwards with a total spread change of about -20% in the 18-month
window surrounding the event. This evidence, in conjunction with the reverse causality tests
in Tables 12 and 13 show that CDS spread changes lead rating changes and not vice-versa.
1.3.3 Horse Race
Finally, to ascertain if CDS spreads are better than credit ratings asmeasures of sovereign risk,
we run a horse race between both measures. In the spirit of Sy (2004), we run pooled logistic
regressions to compare and contrast between k-month changes in CDS spreads, ∆k st−1, and
ratings, ∆k rt−1, the month before the event month t in predicting a sovereign event seven
months before the event. That is,
P(Event in the next seven months) =β0 +β1 ·∆k st−1 +β2∆k rt−1 +ε, (9)
where a sovereign event is defined as an EMBI spread change greater than three standard
deviations from the mean change for that country.
The results of the horse race in Table 15 indicate that a three-month or more CDS spread
change themonth before a sovereign event is statistically significant in predicting a sovereign
event in the next seven months while there is no predictability with for rating changes at any
horizon. These results are consistent with what the prior literature has documented, namely,
the poor track-record of ratings in predicting sovereign crises.
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We then partition our sample into observations in which Moody’s and S&P disagree, i.e.,
a more than one notch difference in a country’s rating, and when they agree, i.e., less than
one notch difference. The results in Table 16 show that the predictability is greater when
there is disagreement between the agencies than when there is agreement. This indicates
that CDS spreads are relatively more useful to investors when there is disagreement between
the agencies, even though CDS spreads are generally more useful than ratings.
1.4 Conclusion
Understanding the determinants of sovereign debt ratings is important to both investors and
corporate managers of domestic firms or multinational firms. Rating downgrades have large
implications for the corporate decisions of the firm since they can put a damper on credit-
availability, a rating downgrade can affect the capital requirements for banks and insurance
companies when they decide to undertake an investment, trigger covenantal obligations, and
cause adverse reputational effects. In particular, downgrades cause the firm to reduce its debt
issuance and leverage, constraining the options available to the firm. The increased frictions
for a firm associated with a corporate downgrades still hold when the country in which it
is domiciled is downgraded, particularly if the firm is rated at or above the home country’s
rating. Hence, understanding the determinants of sovereign ratings and finding a leading
indicator to rating downgrades is beneficial to investors and corporate managers in making
timely decisions.
In this essaywe examine the relationship between sovereign debt ratings andCDS spreads.
Using panel data from 2005 to 2016, we find that the information contained in the average
credit default swap spread over the three years prior to a rating event is important in explain-
ing sovereign debt rating variation. This evidence, while correlational in nature, motivates
the use of CDS spreads in predicting rating changes at the intra-annual level. Our analy-
sis shows that the ability of one-month changes in CDS spreads to predict negative rating
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changes are significant up to seven months prior to the change for both S&P and Moody’s
while there is no consistent predictive ability in one-month changes in CDS spreads to pre-
dict positive ratings. Also, in a horse race setting, we show that three-month CDS spread
changes are able to predict sovereign crises within the next seven months while ratings have
no predictive ability. Overall, we find that a sovereign’s CDS spread, which is a forward look-
ing measure, is available more frequently, and is less costly to compile than macroeconomic
data is the measure of sovereign default that is most useful per ipsum to market participants.
The advantages of market variables over judgmental models has been reinforced by our
analysis. Academics can use the patterns and stylized facts we uncover to buildmore realistic
theoretical models of sovereign default, ratings, and CDS contracts. Investors and corporate
managers of multinational firms as well as policymakers can use the relationship we have
documented between CDS spreads and credit ratings to hedge proactively against real eco-
nomic risks from sovereign downgrades rather than responding reactively.
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Figure 1: Summary Plots. This figure presents summary plots of the 543 observations used
in the panel regressions, which covers the twelve-year period from the beginning of 2005 to
the end of 2016. Panel (A) plots the natural log of the three-year average CDS spread lagged
one year, cd s1:3, as a function of time for each country in our sample and a local regression
(LOESS) curve for the overall sample. Panel (B) plots average rating as a function of time
for each country in our sample and a LOESS curve for the overall sample. Panel (C) plots
average rating as a function of cd s1:3 and the regression line for each individual country in
our sample and for the overall sample.
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Figure 2: OLS Estimates by Year. This figure presents the results of running the following OLS regression for each year in our sample:
rk =αt +βt cd s1:3,k +γt X ′k +uk ,
where rk is the average rating for country k ; cd s1:3,k is the log average CDS spread over the previous three years for country k ; X k is the
vector of macroeconomic controls for country k ; and uk is a random error term. Panel (A) plots the estimated coefficient of interest in
year t (β̂t ), error bars calculated using robust standard errors, and a local regression (LOESS) curve. Panel (B) plots adjusted R2 and
a LOESS curve. We run the regressions both with and without our macroeconomic control variables.
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Figure 3: Plotting CDS Spreads and Ratings for Selected AAA Rated Countries. This figure plots the CDS spreads and average ratings for
countries that were rated AAA at some point and who’s ratings are larger than predicted by the estimated model, r̂kt = α̂+ β̂ · cds1:3,
for countries with negative rating events.
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Figure 4: Monthly CDS Spread Reaction Around Rating Events. This figure plots the mean cumulative spread change over a 16-month
window around (a) negative and (b) positive rating events for our 54 country sample. Rating events refer to downgrades, upgrades, and
changes in outlook. Therefore, a negative (positive) rating event can refer to either a downgrade (upgrade) or a downward (upward)
revision in outlook. We eliminate an event month that immediately follows another event month. The solid line is a local regression
(LOESS) curve while the dashed line connects the mean cumulative spread estimates.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for CDS Spread Data.This table presents the summary results of the
monthly log spreads and monthly spread changes of our sample.
log CDS Spread (log bp.) CDS Change (%)
Country N Mean St. Dev. Skew. Kurt Mean St. Dev. Skew. Kurt.
1 Argentina 135 6.68 0.89 0.27 1.98 −0.32 29.55 −4.03 44.13
2 Australia 94 3.82 0.45 0.28 2.94 −0.02 16.85 0.73 5.97
3 Austria 133 3.47 1.17 −0.79 3.28 1.48 21.14 2.34 16.49
4 Belgium 171 3.14 1.54 −0.20 1.74 0.44 17.89 0.18 8.83
5 Brazil 193 5.48 0.83 1.18 4.08 −0.94 14.89 1.15 6.60
6 Bulgaria 188 4.96 0.93 −0.74 2.75 −0.70 15.82 1.31 7.86
7 Chile 178 4.13 0.67 −0.61 2.67 −0.63 14.21 1.75 11.82
8 China 177 4.07 0.71 −0.58 2.43 −0.20 15.59 0.57 6.48
9 Colombia 178 5.16 0.52 0.83 2.72 −1.08 13.68 1.08 5.56
10 Croatia 190 5.06 0.93 −0.86 2.53 −0.24 15.10 1.40 11.03
11 Cyprus 57 5.82 1.04 0.03 1.36 6.20 19.15 0.94 4.74
12 Czech 97 4.01 1.00 −1.18 3.59 1.91 21.05 0.83 7.55
13 Denmark 112 3.50 0.64 0.87 2.84 1.47 27.88 3.43 24.15
14 Egypt 33 5.12 0.74 0.04 1.98 3.22 26.03 1.54 7.43
15 Estonia 94 4.62 0.63 1.56 4.62 −1.30 12.42 1.92 16.83
16 Finland 76 3.51 0.44 0.63 2.60 2.46 22.16 1.90 9.91
17 France 176 3.00 1.44 −0.31 1.76 0.40 17.74 1.28 8.97
18 Germany 174 2.68 1.05 −0.04 1.83 −0.01 17.75 1.17 10.56
19 Greece 110 4.06 1.99 0.55 1.79 4.55 27.70 1.69 17.03
20 Hong Kong 46 3.74 0.58 −1.76 5.01 3.61 31.47 3.94 26.49
21 Hungary 173 4.65 1.15 −0.25 1.59 0.88 15.64 1.28 8.02
22 Indonesia 151 5.22 0.38 1.44 6.30 −0.88 14.60 1.97 14.05
23 Ireland 99 5.01 1.02 0.10 2.02 1.79 35.01 7.38 66.77
24 Israel 138 4.36 0.70 −0.54 2.14 0.25 16.63 0.33 5.85
25 Italy 176 4.11 1.41 −0.41 1.63 1.22 15.52 0.99 5.49
26 Japan 157 3.18 1.22 −0.44 1.71 0.57 17.40 1.22 6.71
27 Kazakhstan 112 5.09 0.75 0.21 3.18 1.18 19.87 1.89 9.82
28 Latvia 86 5.33 0.93 −1.02 5.38 3.03 39.57 1.68 19.29
29 Lithuania 78 5.25 0.88 −1.91 8.68 3.47 40.95 7.32 60.37
30 Malaysia 191 4.37 0.70 −0.66 2.54 −0.53 14.90 0.84 5.32
31 Mexico 193 4.78 0.49 −0.01 3.51 −0.54 14.54 1.54 9.33
32 Netherlands 109 3.63 0.58 0.41 2.33 0.32 18.06 2.02 12.71
33 New Zealand 49 4.12 0.26 0.16 1.95 −1.24 12.86 0.13 2.76
34 Norway 68 3.04 0.36 0.56 2.57 −2.27 13.39 0.84 6.00
35 Panama 168 4.92 0.40 0.74 3.30 −0.83 12.90 1.45 7.41
36 Peru 169 4.97 0.43 0.91 3.60 −0.87 14.44 1.08 6.75
37 Philippines 185 5.20 0.62 0.40 1.92 −0.85 11.55 1.09 7.78
38 Poland 190 4.06 0.87 −0.22 2.33 0.32 15.85 1.09 8.08
39 Portugal 176 4.29 1.83 −0.30 1.61 1.22 16.82 0.77 4.38
40 Romania 164 4.99 0.88 −0.69 2.72 −0.86 15.70 1.06 6.58
41 Russia 204 5.29 0.73 0.01 2.80 −0.96 15.89 2.08 15.11
42 Slovakia 180 3.79 1.02 −0.37 2.20 −0.70 18.24 1.37 9.52
43 Slovenia 105 4.71 1.08 −1.58 5.80 2.68 26.32 5.18 41.71
44 South Africa 204 4.97 0.59 −0.92 3.36 0.01 13.55 1.44 8.67
45 South Korea 187 4.17 0.64 0.24 3.51 0.01 16.64 1.36 9.03
46 Spain 163 3.91 1.70 −0.65 2.01 1.73 14.96 0.75 4.42
47 Sweden 130 2.43 1.40 −0.22 1.50 1.56 17.95 1.79 11.11
48 Thailand 183 4.41 0.58 −0.21 2.03 −0.47 14.43 0.37 4.67
49 Turkey 205 5.63 0.58 1.02 3.03 −0.38 13.72 0.96 5.17
50 Ukraine 129 6.29 0.87 0.20 2.28 0.60 23.75 −1.79 25.88
51 United Kingdom 106 3.73 0.59 0.02 1.75 0.24 15.92 1.34 7.98
52 United States 79 3.38 0.42 −0.26 1.50 0.01 12.65 0.55 5.69
53 Venezuela 178 6.87 1.04 −0.07 2.50 0.95 16.01 1.33 6.90
54 Vietnam 81 5.37 0.61 −0.83 2.58 1.22 14.42 0.34 4.66
Total 7,578 4.51 1.34 −0.37 3.67 0.30 18.39 2.72 49.87
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Table 2: Annual Data Summary Statistics. There are a total of 54 countries and 543 observa-
tions from 2005 to 2016
Variable N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
cds1:3 543 4.52 4.70 1.28 0.66 8.15
GNI 543 9.51 9.49 1.04 6.63 11.55
GDP Growth 543 3.15 3.14 2.90 −6.32 12.08
Inflation 543 3.01 2.97 3.04 −7.22 12.07
Fiscal Balance 543 −2.30 −2.23 3.98 −24.37 16.19
External Balance 543 −0.17 −0.33 5.64 −26.21 17.22
External Debt 543 0.52 0.45 1.04 −4.51 4.51
Default 543 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
Development 543 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
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Table 3: OLS Estimates.This table presents the reduced form parameter estimates for various specifications
of the following equation:
rkt =βcd s1:3,kt +γX ′kt +αk +τt +ukt ,
where rkt is the rating in year t for country k ; cd s1:3,kt is the log average CDS spread over the previous three
years for country k in year t ; X kt is the vector of macroeconomic controls for country k in year t ; αk controls
for fixed country characteristics; τt controls for the time-varying factors common across all countries; and ukt
is a random error term. Standard errors clustered by country and time are in parenthesis for the fixed effect
regressions while robust standard errors are in parenthesis for the pooled regressions.
Dependent Variable: Average Rating
Pooled Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cds1:3 −2.696*** — −1.952*** −1.704*** — −1.203***
(0.088) (0.114) (0.231) (0.212)
GNI — 3.269*** 1.959*** — 4.069*** 1.295*
(0.216) (0.157) (0.950) (0.663)
GDP Growth — 0.219 0.084 — 0.085 0.102
(0.156) (0.109) (0.160) (0.118)
Inflation — 0.074 −0.119 — 0.127 0.030
(0.136) (0.095) (0.106) (0.078)
Fiscal Balance — 0.155*** 0.045* — 0.154* 0.125*
(0.036) (0.025) (0.070) (0.065)
External Balance — 0.027 0.064*** — −0.088* −0.052
(0.022) (0.016) (0.041) (0.031)
External Debt — −0.476*** −0.361*** — 0.017 0.017
(0.106) (0.090) (0.053) (0.043)
Default — 0.018 0.185 — −1.011 −0.375
(0.267) (0.189) (0.569) (0.467)
Development — 1.198*** 0.043 — −0.090 −0.004
(0.451) (0.298) (0.261) (0.296)
Constant 22.014*** −22.230*** 0.355 — — —
(0.432) (2.003) (1.792)
FE : Country — — — • • •
FE : Time — — — • • •
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543
Adj. R2 0.615 0.592 0.782 0.448 0.396 0.517
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Table 4: Panel Unit Root Tests. This table presents the panel unit root tests of Levin, Lin, and James Chu
(2002) (LLC) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS) for the portion of our sample data of 12 countries that
had a balanced sample of monthly CDS spreads from 2005:01-2016:12. The tests derived when controlling for
autocorrelation are denoted as t∗
δ
(LLC) and w t̄ (IPS).Thenull hypothesis for both tests is that the autoregressive
parameter implies a unit root, however, the LLC test assumes homogenous autoregressive parameters across
panels while the IPS relaxes this assumption. Columns (1) and (3) presents test statistics that are robust to serial
correlation and include panel specific means. Columns (2) and (4) are additionally robust to cross-sectional
dependence.
LLC IPS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lags t∗
δ
p-value t∗
δ
p-value w t̄ p-value w t̄ p-value
1 −2.163 0.015 −4.067 0.000 −2.801 0.003 −1.268 0.103
2 −2.078 0.019 −4.534 0.000 −2.624 0.004 −1.633 0.051
3 −2.346 0.010 −5.184 0.000 −3.222 0.001 −2.268 0.012
4 −2.234 0.013 −4.652 0.000 −3.264 0.001 −1.878 0.030
Panel Mean • • • • • • • •
XS Demean — — • • — — • •
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Table 5: OLS Estimates for Panel Unit Root Subsample.This table presents the reduced form parameter
estimates for various specifications of the following equation:
rkt =βcd s1:3,kt +γX ′kt +αk +τt +ukt ,
where rkt is the rating in year t for country k ; cd s1:3,kt is the log average CDS spread over the previous three
years for country k in year t ; X kt is the vector ofmacroeconomic controls for country k in year t ;αk controls for
fixed country characteristics; τt controls for the time-varying factors common across all countries; and ukt is a
random error term. The sample is restricted to the countries used in the panel unit root tests. Standard errors
clustered by country and time are in parenthesis. Reads: CDS spreads are significantly negatively associated with
average ratings, and CDS spreads subsume themacroeconomic controls the literature has proposed as determinants
of ratings in explaining the variation of average ratings.
Dependent Variable: Average Rating
Pooled Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cd s1:3 −2.334∗∗∗ — −1.742∗∗∗ −1.175∗∗∗ — −1.261∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.197) (0.242) (0.222)
Controls — • • — • •
FE : Country — — — • • •
FE : Time — — — • • •
Observations 209 209 209 209 209 209
R2 0.704 0.655 0.828 0.542 0.452 0.656
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Table 6: Continental Subsample Estimates.This table presents the reduced form parameter estimates for
various specifications of the following equation by continental subsample:
rkt =βcd s1:3,kt +γX ′kt +αk +τt +ukt ,
where rkt is the rating in year t for country k ; cd s1:3,kt is the log average CDS spread over the previous three
years for country k in year t ; X kt is the vector of macroeconomic controls for country k in year t ; αk controls
for fixed country characteristics; τt controls for the time-varying factors common across all countries; and ukt
is a random error term. Standard errors clustered by country and time are in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable: Average Rating
Pooled Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Europe
cd s1:3 −1.905∗∗∗ — −1.334∗∗∗ −0.963∗∗∗ — −1.003∗∗∗
(0.293) (0.222) (0.244) (0.256)
Obs. 243 243 243 243 243 243
Adj. R2 0.489 0.628 0.736 0.398 0.338 0.469
Panel B. Americas
cd s1:3 −3.538∗∗∗ — −2.865∗∗∗ −1.047∗∗ — −0.862∗∗
(0.321) (0.381) (0.463) (0.355)
Obs. 83 83 83 83 83 83
Adj. R2 0.786 0.625 0.806 0.230 0.371 0.439
Panel C. Asia & Oceania
cd s1:3 −3.082∗∗∗ — −1.283∗∗∗ −0.653 — −0.652
(0.448) (0.386) (0.462) (0.398)
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125
Adj. R2 0.524 0.703 0.740 0.068 0.213 0.241
Controls — • • — • •
FE : Country — — — • • •
FE : Time — — — • • •
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Table 7: Predicting Rating Events: Pooled Logit. This table summarizes the results of estimating p
(
1−/+
∆ri ,t
)
=G (α+β∆si ,t−m) , where 1−/+∆ri ,t is an indicator
variable that is equal to one when the difference in the CCR at the end of month t and month t −1 is negative/positive and zero if there is no change; α is the
intercept; p is the probability of success; and G(·) is the logistic link function. Our independent variable∆st−m is the one-month difference of the log CDS spread
lagged back m months. Since estimating the probability of a rating event may be contaminated by events that occur in two consecutive months, we eliminate the
event month that immediately follows another event month. The data is pooled between both agencies. Standard errors are given in the parentheses with stars
indicating ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.10.
Dependent Variable: ∆ in Rating
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
∆st−m 0.583*** 0.654*** 0.710*** 0.616*** 0.861*** 0.773*** 0.670*** −0.157 −0.555**
(0.193) (0.190) (0.186) (0.193) (0.177) (0.182) (0.189) (0.253) (0.261)
Constant −3.300*** −3.298*** −3.298*** −3.298*** −3.310*** −3.307*** −3.305*** −3.304*** −3.309***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Total N 15,156 15,048 14,940 14,832 14,724 14,616 14,508 14,400 14,292
Event N 543 541 538 533 527 523 519 510 50534
Table 8: Predicting Positive and Negative Rating Events: Pooled Logit. This table summarizes the results of estimating p
(
1−/+
∆ri ,t
)
=G (α+β∆si ,t−m) ,
where 1−/+
∆ri ,t
is an indicator variable that is equal to one when the difference in the CCR at the end of month t and month t −1 is negative/positive and zero if there
is no change; α is the intercept; p is the probability of success; and G(·) is the logistic link function. Our independent variable ∆st−m is the one-month difference
of the log CDS spread lagged back m months. Since estimating the probability of a rating event may be contaminated by events that occur in two consecutive
months, we eliminate the event month that immediately follows another event month. The data is pooled between both agencies. Standard errors are given in
the parentheses with stars indicating ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.10.
Panel A. Dependent Variable: −∆ in Rating
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
∆st−m 1.175*** 1.151*** 1.358*** 1.093*** 1.421*** 1.247*** 1.141*** 0.493* 0.136
(0.219) (0.210) (0.201) (0.213) (0.202) (0.219) (0.212) (0.296) (0.347)
Constant -4.150*** -4.146*** -4.153*** -4.133*** -4.169*** -4.157*** -4.145*** -4.117*** -4.112***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
Total N 14,851 14,744 14,639 14,535 14,428 14,322 14,218 14,118 14,013
Event N 238 237 237 236 231 229 229 228 226
Panel B. Dependent Variable: +∆ in Rating
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
∆st−m -1.033*** -0.683* -0.825** -0.383 -0.545 -0.446 -0.469 -1.006*** -1.235***
(0.329) (0.359) (0.350) (0.361) (0.363) (0.364) (0.365) (0.347) (0.341)
Constant -4.005*** -3.993*** -4.000*** -4.001*** -4.000*** -3.995*** -4.003*** -4.029*** -4.035***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.065)
Total N 14,883 14,776 14,668 14,561 14,458 14,353 14,245 14,140 14,035
Event N 270 269 266 262 261 260 256 250 248
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Table 9: Predictability Magnitude.This table presents the probability of a negative rating change for var-
ious ”buckets” of log CDS spread changes over the seven-month period. The probability is estimated using
p
(
1−∆ri ,t
)
=G (α+∑ Ii t ,L:U )
where 1−∆ri ,t is an indicator variable which is equal to one when the difference in the CCR at the end of month
t is negative, α is the intercept, p is the probability of success, G(·) is the logistic link function, and IL:U is an
indicator that equals unity if the rolling seven-month cumulative change in log CDS spread is within the lower
bound L and upper boundU . The upper threshold boundaries are in the first column. The t-statistics are given
in parentheses with stars indicating ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.10.
Coefficients Probabilities
U Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P
5% -0.254 -0.273 - -
(-0.277) (-0.417)
10% -0.073 -0.051 - -
(-0.079) (-0.077)
15% 0.084 -0.113 - -
(0.091) (-0.167)
20% -14.339 -0.818 - -
(-0.028) (-0.936)
30% 0.795 1.422*** - 80.56%
(1.071) (2.606)
40% 1.051** 1.334*** 74.10% 79.15%
(2.113) (3.084)
50% 1.870*** 1.902*** 86.65% 87.01%
(4.481) (4.804)
100% 1.675*** 1.881*** 84.22% 86.78%
(5.177) (6.346)
150% 2.003*** 2.108*** 88.12% 89.16%
(5.371) (6.041)
200% 2.172*** 1.746*** 89.77% 85.15%
(4.919) (3.503)
>200% 2.624*** 2.338*** 93.24% 91.20%
(5.126) (4.208)
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Table 10: Predicting Rating Events: Hazard Model. This table summarizes the results of estimating the instantaneous risk of a downgrade (upgrade)
using the Cox proportional hazard model. Our independent variable ∆st−m is the one-month difference of the log CDS spread lagged back m months. This
specification allows us to control for each country’s period at risk, duration dependence, and the unbalanced nature of our data, i.e., censoring. We are also able
to utilize more data since it includes each country-year as a separate observation which helps to produce more efficient and precise estimates. Since estimating
the probability of a rating event may be contaminated by events that occur in two consecutive months, we eliminate the event month that immediately follows
another event month. Standard errors clustered at the agency, country, and year level are given in the parentheses with stars indicating ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
and *p < 0.10.
Panel A. −∆ in Rating
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
∆st−m 0.853*** 1.165*** 1.467*** 0.879*** 1.437*** 1.488*** 1.321*** 0.977*** 0.639
(0.188) (0.256) (0.237) (0.229) (0.242) (0.232) (0.284) (0.294) (0.493)
Total N 14,920 14,812 14,705 14,597 14,490 14,387 14,281 14,173 14,066
Event N 238 237 237 236 231 229 229 228 226
Panel B. +∆ in Rating
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
∆st−m -0.768*** -1.239** -1.280** -0.597 -1.765** -1.043 -0.172 -0.914 -1.764**
(0.296) (0.565) (0.577) (0.391) (0.844) (0.897) (0.853) (0.906) (0.866)
Total N 14,946 14,839 14,734 14,630 14,523 14,416 14,312 14,209 14,103
Event N 270 269 266 262 261 260 256 250 248
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Table 11: Explaining the Size of the Rating Event. This table summarizes the results of estimating the expected magnitude of a rating change at the
end of month t , ∆rt , conditioned on the one-month CDS spread lagged m months, ∆st−m and controlling for country, year, and agency fixed effects. Since the
estimation may be contaminated by events that occur in two consecutive months, we eliminate the event month that immediately follows another event month.
Standard errors clustered on the country, year, and agency level are given in the parentheses with stars indicating ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.10.
Panel A. −∆ in Rating
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
∆st−m -0.0209** -0.0407*** -0.0399*** -0.0199** -0.0317*** -0.0258*** -0.0257*** -0.0007 0.0148*
(0.0086) (0.0115) (0.0093) (0.0081) (0.0105) (0.0092) (0.0085) (0.0075) (0.0088)
FE : Country • • • • • • • • •
FE : Time • • • • • • • • •
FE : Agency • • • • • • • • •
Total N 14,851 14,744 14,639 14,535 14,428 14,322 14,218 14,118 14,013
Adj. R2 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
Panel B. +∆ in Rating
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
∆st−m -0.0183** 0.0025 -0.0056 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0012 -0.0112** -0.0111**
(0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0058) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0050)
FE : Country • • • • • • • • •
FE : Time • • • • • • • • •
FE : Agency • • • • • • • • •
Total N 14,883 14,776 14,668 14,561 14,458 14,353 14,245 14,140 14,035
Adj. R2 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
38
Table 12: Do rating changes predict CDS spread changes? This table summarizes the results of predicting the one-month log change in CDS spread,
∆st−1, using an indicator variable for the one-month change in upgrades and downgrades m months prior,±∆rt−m , and controlling for country, year, and agency
fixed effects. Since the estimation may be contaminated by events that occur in two consecutive months, we eliminate the event month that immediately follows
another event month. Standard errors clustered on the country, year, and agency level are given in the parentheses with stars indicating ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
and *p < 0.10.
Panel A: Negative Rating Events
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−∆rt−m 0.0110 -0.0036 -0.0155* 0.0222** 0.0202** -0.0051 -0.0174* -0.0208 -0.0159
(0.0263) (0.0134) (0.0093) (0.0107) (0.0087) (0.0126) (0.0098) (0.0162) (0.0104)
FE : Country • • • • • • • • •
FE : Time • • • • • • • • •
FE : Agency • • • • • • • • •
Total N 14,852 14,748 14,644 14,538 14,431 14,324 14,217 14,113 14,008
Adj. Within-R2 0.108 0.104 0.110 0.112 0.111 0.109 0.108 0.110 0.112
Panel A: Positive Rating Events
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
+∆rt−m -0.0073 -0.0118 0.0106 0.0120 0.0018 -0.0018 0.0210 0.0091 -0.0109
(0.0152) (0.0073) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0156) (0.0102) (0.0091)
FE : Country • • • • • • • • •
FE : Time • • • • • • • • •
FE : Agency • • • • • • • • •
Total N 14,881 14,779 14,673 14,568 14,460 14,353 14,249 14,144 14,040
Adj. Within-R2 0.110 0.103 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.108 0.109 0.114 0.112
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Table 13: Predicting Rating Events: Reverse Causality Robustness Test. This table summarizes the results of estimating the probability of a rating
change at the end of month t , ∆rt , conditioned on the one-month CDS spread lagged m months, ∆st−m . Observations with less than 24 months between rating
changes are excluded to mitigate against reverse causality concerns. Since estimating the probability of a rating event may be contaminated by events that occur
in two consecutive months, we eliminate the event month that immediately follows another event month. Standard errors are given in the parentheses with stars
indicating ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.10.
Panel A. −∆ in Rating
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
∆st−m 1.364** 1.215* 2.051*** 1.773*** 0.881 1.096 0.865 -1.498 -1.046
(0.687) (0.717) (0.569) (0.609) (0.780) (0.740) (0.779) (1.028) (1.003)
Constant -4.709*** -4.719*** -4.773*** -4.745*** -4.714*** -4.717*** -4.702*** -4.695*** -4.677***
(0.154) (0.155) (0.16) (0.158) (0.156) (0.157) (0.156) (0.156) (0.154)
Total N 4,842 4,820 4,800 4,779 4,751 4,724 4,696 4,668 4,635
Event N 45 44 44 44 43 43 43 43 43
Panel B. +∆ in Rating
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
∆st−m -0.530 -0.139 -1.403 -1.054 -1.401 -1.660* -0.736 -1.068 -0.405
(0.914) (0.877) (0.980) (0.960) (0.967) (0.977) (0.922) (0.971) (0.910)
Constant -4.584*** -4.579*** -4.612*** -4.599*** -4.581*** -4.582*** -4.556*** -4.617*** -4.581***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.148) (0.146) (0.146) (0.147) (0.144) (0.149) (0.147)
Total N 4,846 4,825 4,804 4,783 4,757 4,730 4,702 4,671 4,639
Event N 49 49 48 48 49 49 49 46 47
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Table 14: Predicting Rating Events: Dropping Countries With Many Rating Changes. This table summarizes the results of estimating p
(
1−/+
∆ri ,t
)
=
G
(
α+β∆si ,t−m
)
, where 1−/+
∆ri ,t
is an indicator variable that is equal to one when the difference in the CCR at the end ofmonth t andmonth t−1 is negative/positive
and zero if there is no change; α is the intercept; p is the probability of success; and G(·) is the logistic link function. Our independent variable ∆st−m is the
one-month difference of the log CDS spread lagged back m months. Since estimating the probability of a rating event may be contaminated by events that occur
in two consecutive months, we eliminate the event month that immediately follows another event month. The data is pooled between both agencies. We drop
observations in the top quintile of rating downgrades (upgrades). For downgrades, these countries are Cyprus (CY), Spain (ES), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU),
Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LT), Portugal (PT), Slovenia (SI), and Ukraine (UA). For upgrades, these countries are Bulgaria (BG), Brazil (BR), Indonesia (ID),
Peru (PE), Philippines (PH), Romania (RO), Russia, (RU), and Slovakia (SK). Standard errors are given in the parentheses with stars indicating ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, and *p < 0.10.
Panel A. −∆ in Rating
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
∆st−m 1.052*** 1.049*** 1.165*** 1.066*** 1.501*** 1.184*** 1.212*** 0.406 0.401
(0.363) (0.323) (0.303) (0.319) (0.278) (0.346) (0.302) (0.476) (0.478)
Constant -4.724*** -4.728*** -4.727*** -4.724*** -4.785*** -4.761*** -4.759*** -4.723*** -4.725***
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100)
Total N 12,130 12,043 11,955 11,871 11,784 11,698 11,614 11,532 11,446
Event N 109 108 108 107 103 102 102 102 101
Panel B. +∆ in Rating
Lag (in months) m = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
∆st−m -0.860** -0.572 -0.711 -0.314 -0.303 -0.222 -0.0364 -1.086*** -1.480***
(0.408) (0.441) (0.433) (0.433) (0.439) (0.435) (0.425) (0.402) (0.378)
Constant -4.267*** -4.254*** -4.266*** -4.245*** -4.243*** -4.241*** -4.257*** -4.287*** -4.303***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.081)
Total N 12,048 11,957 11,865 12,095 12,006 11,915 11,821 11,730 11,638
Event N 168 168 165 171 170 169 165 161 159
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Table 15: Predicting Sovereign Events: Horse Race. This table summarizes the results of a horse race between CDS spreads and ratings in the spirit of Sy
(2004). We estimate the probability of a sovereign event within seven months conditioned on the k-month CDS spread change in the previous month and the
k-month rating change in the previous month. More formally, P(Event) = G(β0 +β1 ·∆k st−1 +β2 ·∆k rt−1). Since the number of sovereign defaults since 2005
is too small to analyze, we proxy for them using the J.P. Morgan Global EMBI blended sovereign bond spreads. We define a sovereign event if a country’s EMBI
sovereign bond spread change is greater than 3 standard deviations from its mean. Standard errors are given in the parentheses with stars indicating ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, and *p < 0.10.
k = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
∆k st−1 -0.034 0.331 0.401** 0.553*** 0.699*** 0.643*** 0.767***
(0.361) (0.212) (0.161) (0.129) (0.109) (0.099) (0.092)
∆k rt−1 0.158 0.012 0.023 -0.144 0.086 0.010 -0.093
(0.261) (0.276) (0.276) (0.295) (0.271) (0.280) (0.294)
Constant -2.741*** -2.729*** -2.730*** -2.732*** -2.762*** -2.746*** -2.764***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073)
Total N 4,036 3,982 3,928 3,874 3,820 3,766 3,712
Event N 247 245 243 241 241 241 241
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Table 16: Differential Predictability of Sovereign Events. This table summarizes the results of a horse race between CDS spreads and ratings in the spirit
of Sy (2004). We estimate the probability of a sovereign event within seven months conditioned on the k-month CDS spread change in the previous month and
the k-month rating change in the previous month. More formally, P(Event) =G(β0+β1 ·∆k st−1+β2 ·∆k rt−1). Since the number of sovereign defaults since 2005
is too small to analyze, we proxy for them using the J.P. Morgan Global EMBI blended sovereign bond spreads. We define a sovereign event if a country’s EMBI
sovereign bond spread change is greater than 3 standard deviations from its mean. We create subsample based on whether there is agreement or disagreement
between both rating agencies. Agreement is defined as a one notch difference or less between the Moody’s and S&P and vice versa. Standard errors are given in
the parentheses with stars indicating ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.10.
Panel A. Disagreement between Moody’s and S&P
k = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
∆k st−1 -0.397 0.222 0.380* 0.592*** 0.727*** 0.682*** 0.816***
(0.502) (0.277) (0.197) (0.151) (0.128) (0.116) (0.109)
∆k rt−1 -0.258 -0.619 -0.404 -0.394 -0.095 -0.455 -0.551
(0.398) (0.464) (0.427) (0.430) (0.382) (0.438) (0.455)
Constant -2.745*** -2.735*** -2.757*** -2.787*** -2.822*** -2.792*** -2.815***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.092) (0.095) (0.094) (0.097)
Total N 2,394 2,376 2,353 2,327 2,296 2,262 2,226
Event N 143 141 139 137 137 137 137
Panel B. Agreement between Moody’s and S&P
k = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
∆k st−1 0.478 0.582 0.479 0.477* 0.650*** 0.574*** 0.682***
(0.577) (0.368) (0.294) (0.247) (0.212) (0.194) (0.176)
∆k rt−1 0.596* 0.604* 0.468 0.128 0.298 0.469 0.365
(0.351) (0.352) (0.367) (0.407) (0.387) (0.369) (0.389)
Constant -2.742*** -2.724*** -2.691*** -2.653*** -2.678*** -2.681*** -2.692***
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106) (0.109) (0.110) (0.113)
Total N 1,642 1,606 1,575 1,547 1,524 1,504 1,486
Event N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
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2 Cross-Border Acquisitions and Dyadic Distance
Hymer (1960), in his dissertation which founded the field of international business, noted
that there is a “liability of foreignness” when firms expand their operations to other countries.
The introduction of the gravity equation to economics by Tinbergen (1962) – which analo-
gizes Newton’s law of universal gravitation to cross-border flows – has allowed researchers to
explore the empirical structure of the costs and benefits of cross-border mergers and acqui-
sitions, i.e. “liability of foreignness”. From these foundations, both the theoretical literature
and empirical literature have focused on studying the determinants of foreign direct invest-
ment, international trade, and cross border mergers and acquisitions19 .
Researchers have focused on completed deals to either investigate if themergers are value
creating or to find out the determinants of cross border mergers and acquisitions. These de-
terminants may either be firm level factors like firm size, public status, industry affiliation,
mode of payment or country level factors like differences in institutional and cultural charac-
teristics. We study the impact of differences in cultural, institutional, and geographic factors
between an acquirer-target country pair, or the dyadic distances, on cross border mergers
and acquisitions. We investigate the differences in country level factors that influence the
decision to enter the market for cross border acquisitions. For the initiated deals, we exam-
ine the country level differences that influence the likelihood of completion/failure of deal.
Furthermore, for the completed acquisitions we investigate what country level factors influ-
ence the duration from the time of initiation to the date of completion.
19Theoretical work has a long history and remains a vibrant area of study, e.g., Anderson (1979), Helpman
and Krugman (1985), Bergstrand (1985), Davis (1995), Deardoff (1998), and Anderson and vanWincoop (2003).
The empirical economics literature has evaluated trade protection (Harrigan, 1993), regional trade agreements
(Frankel, Stein, and Wei, 1998), exchange rate variability (Frankel and Wei, 1993; Eichengreen and Irwin, 1998),
border effects (McCallum, 1995; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), and cross border mergers & acquitions
(Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012; Serdar Dinc and Erel, 2013; Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll,
2013; Kim and Lu, 2013, Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi, 2015).
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Our study is the first, to our knowledge, to study these three facets of acquisitions – initi-
ation, completion, and duration – within a large-scale unified framework.20 Our dependent
variables – initiation, completion, and duration – are a novel addition to the literature. There
are no studies looking at factors influencing the initiation, completion, or duration of the
cross-border acquisition deal within a unified framework.21 Our study fills this gap. Addi-
tionally, our sample period captures a longer time-period and a larger cross-section of firms
undertaking cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
Using a sample of 173,616 cross-border mergers occurring between 1970 and 2016, we es-
timate the factors that affect the likelihood that a firm will initiate a cross-border deal, that it
will complete the cross-border deal, and the duration of the deal, i.e., time between the an-
nouncement and effective date of the deal. We find that cultural, institutional, geographical,
religious, and language differences, all play a deciding role in the initiation of mergers and
acquisitions. The higher these differences the lower the probability of initiation of cross bor-
der merges and acquisitions. Next, we find that completion of deal is independent of cultural
and institutional factors, but largely depends on differences in economy size, language, and
religion of the acquiring and target countries. Lastly, our analysis of duration reveals that
there is no impact of cross-country cultural or institutional differences on the time between
the initiation and completion of the deal.
Differences in culture (e.g., Weber, 1930; Veliz, 1994; Landes, 1998; Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales, 2003, 2006), institutions (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; La Porta, Lopez de Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Hirshleifer, 2001), and geography (e.g., Myrdal, 1968; Sachs, 2003)
20While we are the first to analyze the initiation, completion, and duration for cross-border mergers and
acquisitions, Dikova et al (2010) uses similar definition for completion and duration. However, they study
business service industry only. They do not study initiation, and their completion and duration variables are
deal level variables instead of country level variables used in our study.
21Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2013) study the time between successive mergers and acquisitions to infer the
impact of learning through repetitive acquisitions. However, there are no studies to our knowledge looking at
the factors influencing the duration between the announcement date and the completion, or effective, date.
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have been found to be important fundamental causes of cross-country differences in eco-
nomic outcomes. Cultural differences between countries – such as differences in religion,
language, and general shared experiences – play a key role in shaping economic decision
making and outcomes. Different cultures generate diverse sets of beliefs about how to be-
have, which in turn influence equilibrium outcomes and results in countries coordinating on
different equilibria. Differences in institutions shape economic outcomes through various
channels; for example, a lack of property rights de-incentivize economic agents while func-
tioning markets help allocate resources efficiently. Differences in geographic endowments
naturally determine the preferences and opportunity set of economic agents across differ-
ent countries. For example, geography may determine the development and availability of
different technologies.
These three fundamental factors have also become the recent focus in explaining cross-
border acquisition flows between countries. Ahern et al. (2015) isolates the impact of cul-
ture on cross-border acquisitions. They find that countries that are more distant culturally
have lower cross-border acquisition activity. Rossi and Volipin (2004) find that the volume
of cross-country acquisitions is larger in countries with stronger accounting standards and
stronger shareholder protection. In a similar vein, Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2013) find that
geographic distance and differences in various institutional factors – such as accounting dis-
closures and economic development – are positively related to cross-border acquisition flows
between countries. Additionally, the literature has documented that in countries with far-
right parties or in times of weak government there is more intervention in large-scale foreign
acquisitions (Serdar Dinc and Erel, 2014).
While the prior literature has studied the importance of culture, institutions, and geogra-
phy, the emphasis has been on the flows or propensity of cross-border acquisitions, defined
either as dollar volume or as the number of acquisitions between the target-acquirer coun-
try pair relative to the sum of domestic mergers in the target country and the number of
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acquisitions between the target-acquirer country pair. Researchers have also restricted their
sample to completed deals where the acquirer acquires majority stakes in the target firm and
the value of deal is more than $1 million. They exclude all deals that were initiated but could
not be completed. By excluding such deals, the sample is biased towards larger firms from
more developed countries.22
In our study, we alleviate these sample selection issues by considering all the initiated
deals irrespective of their completion status, their size, and the proportion of the stake that
the acquirer receives. Moreover, instead of dollar volume, we use number of deals, thus al-
leviating bias towards the bigger companies and companies from the developed world. This
allows us to study the holistic view of cultural differences on cross border mergers.
A priori, we expect that cultural, institutional, and geographic factors should be signif-
icant in explaining the initiation of cross-border acquisitions; institutional factors should
be significant in explaining the completion of cross-border acquisitions; and that none of
the fundamental factors should be significant in explaining the duration of the deal. More
specifically, firms prefer to acquire firms domiciled in countries in which the overall dyadic
distance is small. Once the decision to initiate an acquisition is made, institutional differ-
ences will become more important in determining whether the deal is seen through to com-
pletion. The duration of the deal would depend more on institutional factors, however, id-
iosyncratic factors are more important and will dominate. Our results indicate that culture,
geographic distance and institutional differences are all important in explaining the initia-
tion of cross-border deals. However, only the bureaucracy distancemeasure and the religious
distance measure are significant in explaining the completion. Finally, our results show that
the duration of the deal is not explained by any fundamental factor implying that there are
idiosyncratic factors that explain the variation in the average duration.
22Size matters because in developing and under developed economies, a company of $1 million value is a
bigger firm.
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The remainder of the essay is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the empirical
strategy; Section 3 discusses the empirical results; Section 4 concludes.
2.1 Estimation Strategy
In this section, we provide a simple theoretical model, based onHead and Reis (2004), which
generates predictions for each country’s cross-border acquisition flows based on its economic
size and dyadic distance. The model explicitly considers the acquisition decision and also al-
lows for an arbitrary number of different sized countries. We are able to generate predictions
regarding the signs of our coefficients of interest. We then turn to the empirical framework
and discusses the statistical implementation of our model.
2.1.1 Theoretical Model
In this section, we re-present the model developed by Head and Reis (2004), changing the
notation to fit our sitatio, to show how we expected factors that increase the likelihood of
initiation will have positive signs and those that decrease the likelihood will have a negative
sign.
Suppose each country i has Ti target firms. Each country j has A j acquiring firms bid-
ding to acquire the target firms. There are a total of Aw =∑ j A j acquiring firms worldwide.
The acquiring firms bid on each of the of Tw =∑i Ti available target firms. The winning bid
for a firm in country i is Vi . This implies that the aggregate stock of capital is Ki = Vi ·Ti .
The probability that a given target firm in i is acquired by an acquirer firm in j is denoted by
πi j . The expected level of cross-border acquisitions is therefore
Mi j ≡πi j ·Ki (10)
If each acquiring firm has a different valuation for particular firms, and their valuations
are i.i.d., then each acquirer has an equal probability of winning the bid, which is equal to
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1/Aw . As such, the probability that any one firm from country j acquires a particular firm
in country i is πi j = A j /Aw and the expected level of cross-border acquisitions is
Mi j =
Ki · A j
Aw
. (11)
By summing over all target countries i , we can obtain an equation for the total investment
outflows of acquiring country j
M j w =
∑
i ̸= j
Mi j =
A j
Aw
·
∑
i ̸= j
Ki =
A j
Aw
· (Kw −K j ) =
A j
Aw
·Kw ·
(
1− K j
Kw
)
(12)
The investment inflows to the target country i can be obtained in a similar fashion by sum-
ming over all acquiring countries j ,
Mi w =
∑
j ̸=i
Mi j = Ki
Aw
·
∑
j ̸=i
A j = Ki
Aw
· (Aw − Ai ) = Ki ·
(
1− Ai
Aw
)
(13)
The overall worldwide level of acquisition investment is equal to the sum of either the inflows
or outflows,
Mw w =
∑
i
Mi w =
∑
j
M j w
= Kw
[
1−∑
i
(A j /Aw )(K j /Kw )
] (14)
The notation can be simplified by allowing lower case letters to denote the shares of
worldwide values, i.e., xi = Xi /Xw . We also let mOj = M j w /Mw w denote outflow shares
and m Ii = Mi w /Mw w denote inflow shares. Combining this with equations (12) and (13), the
share of inflows and outflows can be recast as
mOj = a j
(
1−k j
1−∑i ai ki
)
, (15)
m Ii = ki
(
1−ai
1−∑ j a j k j
)
. (16)
These equations offer simple predictions of the cross-border acquisition flows as functions
of the number and value of target firms in the acquirer country and target country.
These two equations require estimates of the number of firms and the overall capital stock.
Lacking readily available measures of Ai and Ki , we consider the simplifying assumption
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that acquirer and target firms are distributed in proportion to the economy overall size of the
economy. This symmetry assumption simplifies the algebra, and we can write replace Si for
Ai and Ki to get
mOj = m Ii = s j
(
1− s j
1−H
)
, (17)
where H ≡ ∑i s2i is the Herfindahl concentration index for the worldwide distribution of
economic activity.
While this simple model yields a remarkably compact expression for the shares of cross-
border inflows and outflows, we have ignored the role that frictions play. And there are good
reasons to believe that acquirers will be more likely to acquire target firms if they have lower
costs. In order to take frictions into account, we need to define v∗hi j , which is the private
valuation of the acquiring bidder h from country j ’s for the representative target firm in
country i , which is a function of observed and unobserved characteristics,
v∗hi j =β ·Xhi j +εhi j . (18)
We assume that the unobserved characteristics have a Gumbel cumulative distribution func-
tion,
exp[−exp(−εhi j )],
and that this refers to the base valuation in a frictionless world.
Due to the cost of controlling a target firm from a remote head office, the acquiring firm
reduces its bid by an amount equal to θ lndi j , where di j measures the economic distance
or transaction costs between source and host country, which we term the dyadic distance.
As McFadden’s (1974) showed, the probability that a target will yield an acquirer the highest
profits within its choice set (assuming the unobserved characteristics have a Gumbel cdf) is
given by the logit expression:
exp(−θ lndi j )∑
ℓ exp(θ lndiℓ)
, (19)
where ℓ indexes all the competing acquirers for the representative firm in country i .
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Since all bidders from a given country are assumed to be symmetric, we obtain the ag-
gregate probability of any bidder from acquiring country j winning the bid for the target in
country i as
πi j =
si /dθi j∑
ℓ sℓ/d
θ
iℓ
(20)
where ℓ now indexes all the countries where the competing acquirers are headquartered.23
We can now express the cross-border acquisitions levels by substituting Equation (20)
into (10)
Mi j /Sw = si s j pi d−θi j , (21)
where pi ≡ (∑ℓ sℓ/dθiℓ)−1 is the ”bid potential” for a representative firm in country i , which
measures the proximity of the acquiring firms to the representative target firm.
Therefore our model predicts that cross-border acquisitions are: (i) proportional to the
size of the target and acquirer countries and (ii) with closer proximity to the target firm, while
it is (ii) inversely proportional with dyadic distance.
2.1.2 Empirical Formulation
This theoretical model we deduced in the previous section is an example of the gravity equa-
tion used to measure trade flows. More generally, the stochastic version of the gravity equa-
tion has the form
Mi j =α0Y α1i Y α2j D−θi j ηi j (22)
which states that cross-border flows are proportional to the product of the economic size,
denoted by Yi and Y j , and inversely proportional to their distance, Di j ‘, broadly construed
to include all factors that might create frictions.
We can empirically estimate the gravity equation by log-linearizing Equation (22),
ln Mi j =α0 +α1 lnYi +α2 lnY j −θ lnDi j + lnηi j . (23)
23Note that firms from country i are included in the set of bidders for country i ’s target firms.
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However, the issue with this estimation strategy is that it introduces bias since country pairs
with zero acquisition flows are necessarily excluded. This selection effect induces a positive
correlation between the unobserved errors ηi j and the dyadic distance measures di j .
We collect our mergers and acquisitions data from Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum
database. The initial sample is comprised of 1,005,488 acquisitions from 1970 until June 2016.
In line with the literature, we remove 61,830 deals in which the acquirer or target nation data
is missing or recorded as “unknown”. We additionally remove 724,852 domestic acquisitions.
Our finalmergers and acquisitions sample consists of cross-border acquisition 218, 806 deals.
Using this mergers and acquisitions sample, we create our measures of Initiation and
Completion used as the dependent variables. First is deal Initiation, which is defined as the
number of cross-border acquisitions from acquirer country to target country relative to the
total number of cross-border acquisitions for acquirer country. This allow us to capture the
proportion of deal initiated by acquirer country. Second is deal Completion, which is de-
fined as proportion of completed cross-border acquisitions from acquirer country to target
country relative to the number of cross-border acquisitions initiated from acquirer country
to target country. To capture the effects of culture, we use: Hofstede’s (1980) six dimensions
– the Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, Long-term Orienta-
tion, and Indulgence indices – to measure cultural distance; the Language variable from One
World Nations online; and the Religion variable from the 2000 CIA Factbook. To capture
role of political institutions, we use the Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucracy scores
from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) political risk subcomponents. To capture
the effects of geography, we include the natural logarithm of the kilometer distance between
the acquirer and target country which we denote as Distance.
Our interest lies in estimating the overall effects of dyadic distance on cross border merg-
ers and acquisitions. We create two indices of dyadic distance using theMahalnobis measure
assuming zero covariance between the different dimensions of culture (Kogut and Singh,
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1988). Formally, the dyadic distance index between the acquirer country and target country,
denoted I j−i , is measured as a weighted-average of the various index components:
I j−i = 1
N
N∑
n=1
cn j −cni
σ2c
, (24)
where cn j −cni is the difference between acquirer j and target i for the nth component of the
index; σ2c is the variance of the component across all countries, and N is the total number
of components used to create the index. In particular, we create a variable denoted Culture
with the six cultural dimension indices as components and a variable denoted Culture & In-
stitutions which includes the Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucracy scores in addition
to the six cultural dimension indices.
After merging our final mergers and acquisition sample with the distance measures, we
obtain the sample used in the cross-sectional analysis. This final sample consists of 173,616
cross-border mergers and acquisition deals covering 77 countries. Tables 17 and 18 reports
the sample summary statistics of selected cultural and institutional variables; Table 19 reports
the summary statistics of our regression variables; andTable 20 reports the correlationmatrix
for all of our variables.
2.1.3 Cross-Sectional Analysis
To examine how the differences in culture, institutions, and geography affect the initiation,
completion, and duration of cross-border merger and acquisition deals we run various spec-
ifications of the following logit models at the cross-sectional level:
Initiationi j =G(α+β ·Culti j +γ · Insti j +ϑ ·Geoi j +ς ·X ′i j )+εi j , (25)
Completioni j =G(α+β ·Culti j +γ · Insti j +ϑ ·Geoi j +ς ·X ′i j )+εi j , (26)
Durationi j =G(α+β ·Culti j +γ · Insti j +ϑ ·Geoi j +ς ·X ′i j )+εi j , (27)
where Culti j denotes our measures of cultural distance (Culture & Institutions, Culture,
Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, Long-term Orienta-
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tion, Indulgence, Language, Religion); Insti jdenotes our measures of institutional distance
(Culture & Institutions, Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucracy); and Geoi j denotes
our measures of geography (Distance).
Since the dependent variables range from zero to one, inclusive, we estimate the param-
eters of interest (β, γ, and ϑ) using a fractional logistic model (Papke and Wooldridge, 2006;
Wooldridge, 2011). Following the literature, we cluster the standard errors by the target coun-
try in all of our regressions.
2.2 Results
Table 21 displays results of the cross-sectional regressions from Equation (2) related to the
initiation of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. We first run the regressions using the
fractional logit model as our dependent variable is the probability of initiation of cross bor-
der mergers and acquitions and varies between 0 and 1. Additionally we use Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood methods (PPML) of Silva and Tenreyro (2006) which has been exten-
sively used in the studies that estimate gravity equation (Tenreyro, 2007; Fally, 2013; Irarraz-
abal, Moxnes, and Opromolla, 2013; Karolyi and Taboda, 2015). As the data of independent
variables that we study is retrieved from different sources, there is difference in the number
of observations across these variables. In our regressions, we start with the variables that
has maximum number of observations (8,813 in column 1) and then include other variables
based on a decreasing trend in data availability (3,844 in column 6). This allow us to maxi-
mize the use of independent variable observations thereby improving the power of test. We
observe several interesting patterns in the regression results. From the fractional logit results
in Column (1), we observe that that the coefficients for language and geographic distance are
negative and significant whereas the coefficient for prior experience is significantly positive.
Large differences in language is related to lower initiation but differences in religion is not
significant. The larger the geographical distance, the less initiation there is between coun-
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tries; more experience leads to more initiations. In column 4, we report PPML estimates for
the equation similar to column 1 and find our results to be qualitatively similar.
Next, we add the differences in economy size (GDP) between the acquirer and target
countries to our regressions. This reduces our number of observations to 7,862 in column
(2). We find the coefficient on size to be negative and highly significant indicating that larger
differences in size is related to lower initiations. Wehave similar resultswith PPML in column
(5).
Finally, we add the cultural and institutional differences between acquirer and target
countries to the regression equation and report the results in column (3). We observe nega-
tive and significant coefficient for power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long
term orientation, and indulgence. This supports our argument that there is lower probability
of initiation of cross border mergers and acquisitions if there are larger cultural differences
between nations. We also find that the coefficient for differences in institutional measures
of corruption, law and order and bureaucracy are all insignificant. Again, in Column (6) we
observe that our results are qualitatively similar using the PPML method.
Overall our results indicate that cultural differences between target and acquirer coun-
tries are important determinants in the decision to initiate a cross border merger or acqui-
sitions. Surprisingly, we do not find any evidence of the institutional differences between
acquirer and target countries to impact the initiation of cross border mergers. We also find
that differences in size of economy, in the language spoken, religion followed and geographi-
cal distances among acquirer and target also play an important role in initiation. Finally, the
significance of experience indicates that past-experience of mergers and acquisitions in the
same country increases the probability further acquisitions in that target country.
Table 22 displays results of the cross-sectional regressions from Equation (2) related to
the completion of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. We see that differences in individ-
ualism, language, religion, and the size of the country affects the completion of the deal. In
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general, we do not find any effect of cultural factors on the probability of completion of cross
border mergers and acquisitions. We find that religion difference does matter in probability
of completion of cross border mergers and acquisitions. There is lower probability of com-
pletion when the religion of acquirer and target countries are different. We find that larger
the difference in size of the acquirer and target countries the lower is the probability of com-
pletion. Among institutional factors, we find that difference in bureaucracy between target
and acquirer country affect the probability of completion. For the full sample of observations
(5302) we do not find language differences to impact the probability of completion but for the
reduced sample with all the variables (2007 observations), we find the coefficient of language
to be significantly positive. This empirical finding is counter intuitive as it indicates that if
the acquirer and target countries have same language then the probability of completion of
cross border mergers and acquisition is lower. Overall, our findings suggest that cultural fac-
tors do not affect the probability of completion, however completion of the deals is mainly
driven by bureaucracy. Similar level of bureaucracy across acquirer and target increases the
probability of completion of the deal.
In Table 23, we report the results for OLS and PPML regressions with the duration as de-
pendent variable. We do not find any effect of cultural, institutional, or geographical factors
on the duration of deals between acquirer and target nation.
Overall our results indicate that the lower the cultural and bureaucratic distance among
the nations, the higher the initiation of cross border merger and acquisitions between them.
We also find that the completion of deal does not depend on cultural factors however the
higher difference in bureaucracy between the nations the lower is the probability of comple-
tion. Finally we find that the duration of the deals from announcement to effective date does
not depend on any cultural or institutional factors.
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2.3 Robustness Analysis
2.3.1 Effect of Prior Completion and Duration of Completed Deals
It can be argued that the initiation of deal may depend on whether the firms from the ac-
quiring nation were able to complete mergers and acquisitions with the firms from the target
nations in past and how much time did it took for them to complete the deals. If there is
a history of successful completion where the deals are completed in a reasonable time, then
firmsmay bemotivated to initiate further acquisitions. Similarly, firmsmay be deterred from
initiating mergers and acquisitions if there is history of failed completions or it takes firms
unreasonably longer time to complete acquisitions.
It may also be argued that firms from acquiring nationsmay learn from prior acquisitions
in a target nation and hence completing a deal in any year may depend on its history of
successful completions in prior years. Also, all acquiring firms who initiate a deal may want
to complete the acquisition in shortest possible time. The history of prior completions may
provide them useful information on how to complete the deals in reasonable time.
In the context of our dependent variables based on the above arguments, we expect ini-
tiation in any year to be dependent on the completions and the duration of completing the
deals in prior years. Similarly, the completion and duration of a deal between acquirer and
target nations in any year should be influenced by the completion of deals between the same
country pairs in the prior years. As these arguments are based on the level of experience
between the acquirer and target nation pairs, we use the data on cross border mergers and
acquisitions for the latest year in our data when the experience in completing the deals is
at a maximum, 2015. We measure the prior year completion experience as the number of
completed deals out of the initiated deals between the acquiring and target nation pairs in
all the years prior to 2015. Similarly, we measure duration experience between the acquiring
and target nation pairs as the average duration between announcement and the deal effective
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dates prior to 2015. We include the completion experience and duration experience in our
prior models for initiation, completion, and duration and report our results in Table 24.
In column (1), we find the initiation of deal between acquirer and target to be unaffected
by prior completion and duration experiences. Initiation depends mainly on cultural, geo-
graphical, and institutional differences between countries. Next, for completion as depen-
dent variable, in column (2) we find the coefficient of completion experience to be signifi-
cantly positive indicating that prior experience in completing deals increases the probability
of completion for subsequent mergers and acquisitions. In column (3) where we include
prior completion experience in explaining the duration, we find the coefficient for comple-
tion experience to be statistically insignificant indicating that prior completion experience
the deals does not play any role in deciding the time taken to complete a deal.
2.3.2 Different Measures of Distance
To test whether our measures of culture, institutions, and geography are adequete proxies,
in Table 25 we re-run our regressions using 9 different measures of distance from Berry,
Guillen, and Zhou (2010). ∆Culture j−i measures the log difference in attitudes toward au-
thority, trust, individuality, and the importance of work and family using data from the
World Value Survey. ∆Geography j−i is the log great circle distance between the geographic
center of each country. ∆Administrative j−i measures the log differences in colonial ties,
language, religion, and legal systems. ∆Demographic j−i measures the differences in demo-
graphic characteristics. ∆Political j−i measures the differences in political stability, democ-
racy, and trade-bloc membership. ∆Economic j−i measures the difference in economic de-
velopment and macroeconomic characteristics. ∆Financial j−i measures the difference in
financial sector development. ∆Integration j−i measures the differences in tourism and in-
ternet usage. ∆Innovation j−i measures the differences in patents and scientific production.
Our results using these independently calculated distance measures reconfirm our re-
sults. Culture, Geography, Economic, Financial, Integration, and Innovative distance are
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influence inititations. Culture and Economic distance drop out while Political distance in-
fluence completions. Only Innovation differences affect duration, while none of the cultural,
geographic, or institutional factors matter.
2.4 Conclusion
All in all, we contribute to this growing area by studying the effects of differences in cultural,
institutional, and geographic factors between an acquirer-target country pair, or the dyadic
distance, on the initiation, completion, and duration of cross-border acquisition deals. In
particular, using a sample of 173,616 cross-border mergers occurring between 1970 and 2016,
we estimate the factors that affect the likelihood that a firm will initiate a cross-border deal,
complete the cross-border deal, and the time between the announcement and effective date
of the deal (see Section 3). Our study is the first, to our knowledge, to study these three facets
of acquisitions – initiation, completion, and duration – within a large-scale unified frame-
work. Our results show that culture, institutions, and geography are important determinants
in the initiation and completion of cross-border acquisitions. More specifically, culture dif-
ferences, institutional, and geographical distance are of paramount importance in whether
firms decide to initiate cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Cultural and geographic dis-
tance do not play a large role in determining whether firms follow through and complete the
deal; what matters in the completion of initiated deals are institutional differences. The dura-
tion from initiation to completion is unaffected by any institutional, cultural, or geographical
factors and solely depends on idiosyncratic factors.
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Figure 5: Share of Acquisition Flow as Function of Economic Size and Concentration. The
figure plots the relationship from equation (8), where we relate acquisition flows to a coun-
try’s relative economic size and the worldwide economic concentration. Reads: There is a
nonlinear relationship between the acquisition flows and economic size for a given country.
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Figure 6: Network of Completed Deals Between Dyads. The lines, or edges, between the coun-
try pairs are based on the number of completed acquisitions. The larger the width of the edge,
the larger the total number of acquisitions between the countries and vice-versa. The size of
the node of each country is based on a measure of importance known as Authority. The in-
tensity of the color indicates the importance of the country to the overall network measured
by the Betweenness Centrality. Reads: The network of countries which complete cross-border
acquisitions is dominated by a few ‘countries.
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Table 17: Summary Statistics of Cultural Variables.
This tables presents the country-level measures of culture from Hofstede
(1980) that are used to construct the distance measures. These variables
are the Power Distance Index (PDI), Individualism Index (IDV), Mas-
culinity Index (MAS), Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), Long-Term
Orientation Index (LTO), Indulgence Index (IND), and the Overall Cul-
ture Index (OCI).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO IND OCI
Afghanistan 41 47 57 75 18 62 1.48
Angola 83 18 20 60 10 83 2.56
Argentina 41 47 57 75 18 62 1.48
Australia 27 99 62 41 22 71 2.40
Austria 0 58 82 60 43 63 2.60
Bangladesh 74 16 56 50 41 20 1.72
Belgium 58 81 54 83 87 57 2.22
Brazil 62 38 49 65 50 59 1.14
Bulgaria 63 28 39 74 72 16 1.83
Canada 30 87 52 38 27 68 1.95
Chile 56 20 26 75 30 68 1.69
China 74 16 68 21 100 24 3.14
Colombia 60 8 66 69 10 83 2.24
Costa Rica 26 11 18 75 — — —
Croatia 67 32 39 69 60 33 1.37
Czech Republic 49 61 58 63 73 29 1.54
Denmark 8 80 12 14 34 70 3.37
Dominican Rep 58 28 67 36 10 54 1.10
Ecuador 72 2 64 57 — — —
Egypt 63 22 44 69 3 4 2.41
El Salvador 59 15 39 83 18 89 2.23
Estonia 31 64 28 50 87 16 2.35
Fiji 72 9 46 38 — — —
Finland 24 67 23 49 38 57 1.73
France 61 76 42 75 66 48 1.59
Germany 26 72 68 55 57 40 1.71
Ghana 74 11 39 55 0 72 2.18
Greece 53 34 58 100 46 50 1.82
Guatemala 90 0 36 89 — — —
Honduras 74 16 39 40 — — —
Hong Kong 61 22 58 20 74 17 2.30
Hungary 38 87 92 71 60 31 2.66
Iceland 20 64 6 40 27 67 2.48
India 71 49 57 31 52 26 1.60
Indonesia 72 9 46 38 64 38 1.75
Ireland-Rep 18 75 70 26 22 65 2.38
Israel 2 56 47 70 38 — —
Italy 42 82 72 64 63 30 1.92
Jamaica 37 39 70 5 — — —
Japan 46 47 100 81 82 42 2.91
(Continued on next page)
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Table 17 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO IND OCI
Jordan 63 28 44 55 13 43 1.42
Kenya 63 22 61 40 — — —
Kuwait 85 22 39 69 — — —
Latvia 35 75 4 53 72 13 2.80
Lebanon 69 40 67 40 11 25 1.86
Lithuania 33 64 16 55 87 16 2.56
Luxembourg 31 64 50 60 67 56 1.46
Malawi 63 28 39 40 — — —
Malaysia 100 24 50 27 41 57 2.27
Malta 48 62 47 85 48 66 1.49
Mexico 75 28 71 71 22 97 2.46
Morocco 63 22 53 58 11 25 1.67
Namibia 58 28 39 36 29 — —
Netherlands 29 87 10 43 53 68 2.48
New Zealand 12 86 59 39 28 75 2.44
Nigeria 74 28 61 45 10 84 2.08
Norway 22 74 3 40 34 55 2.53
Pakistan 47 9 50 60 23 0 2.26
Panama 90 6 43 75 — — —
Peru 57 12 41 76 23 46 1.55
Philippines 89 31 66 35 20 42 2.03
Poland 61 64 66 82 31 29 1.71
Portugal 56 25 29 92 27 33 1.93
Romania 85 28 41 79 53 20 1.95
Saudi Arabia 90 22 61 69 36 52 1.83
Serbia 81 22 42 81 53 28 1.77
Sierra Leone 63 16 39 40 — — —
Singapore 68 16 48 0 58 46 2.51
Slovenia 65 25 16 77 50 48 1.76
South Africa 41 69 64 39 33 63 1.54
South Korea 53 14 38 74 87 29 2.11
Spain 49 53 41 75 49 44 1.22
Sri Lanka 74 34 6 36 38 — —
Surinam 80 48 36 81 — — —
Sweden 22 76 0 20 40 78 3.31
Switzerland 25 73 72 48 78 66 2.20
Taiwan 51 13 44 59 88 49 1.86
Tanzania 63 22 39 40 33 38 1.37
Thailand 57 16 32 54 40 45 1.35
Trinidad 39 12 59 45 10 80 1.44
Turkey 59 36 44 74 47 49 1.19
United Kingdom 26 98 68 26 52 69 2.62
United States 40 91 62 46 29 68 1.90
Uruguay 54 35 37 88 24 53 1.59
Venezuela 75 7 76 65 13 100 2.98
Vietnam 63 16 39 21 59 35 1.86
Zambia 53 34 39 40 29 42 1.23
(Continued on next page)
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Table 17 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO IND OCI
Average 53.82 40.21 46.86 55.20 42.01 49.25 2.01
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Table 18: Summary Statistics of Institutional Variables.
This tables presents the country-level measures of institutions from Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide. These variables are the Corruption Index, the Law
and Order Index, the Bureaucracy Index, and the overall Institutions Index.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Corruption Law and Order Bureaucracy Institutions
Albania 2 2.5 2 2.06
Algeria 2 3 2 1.90
Angola 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.22
Argentina 2 2.5 3 1.61
Armenia 1.5 3 1 1.59
Australia 4.5 5.5 4 3.32
Austria 4.5 6 4 3.43
Azerbaijan 1.5 3.5 1 1.84
Bahamas 4 4.5 3 1.47
Bahrain 3 4.5 2 1.14
Bangladesh 3 2 2 1.72
Belarus 1.5 3.5 1 2.38
Belgium 5 5 4 3.06
Bolivia 1.5 2.5 2 2.55
Botswana 3.5 3.5 2 1.34
Brazil 2.5 2 2 1.73
Brunei 2.5 5 3.5 1.16
Bulgaria 2 2.5 2 1.73
Burkina Faso 2 3 1 —
Cameroon 2 2 1.5 —
Canada 5 5.5 4 4.09
Chile 4.5 4.5 3 1.75
Colombia 2.5 2 2 1.73
Costa Rica 2.5 3 2 1.36
Croatia 2 4.5 3 1.31
Cuba 2.5 3 2 1.97
Cyprus 4 5 4 2.01
Czech Republic 2.5 5 3 1.28
Denmark 5.5 6 4 4.25
Ecuador 2.5 2.5 2 1.49
Egypt 2 3 2 1.45
El Salvador 2 2 2 2.02
Estonia 3.5 4 2.5 1.11
Ethiopia 1.5 4.5 1.5 1.73
Finland 5.5 6 4 4.06
France 4.5 5 3 2.24
Gabon 2 3 1.5 3.12
Gambia 2 3.5 2 1.64
Germany 5 5 4 3.09
Ghana 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.49
Greece 2 4.5 3 1.36
Guatemala 1.5 1.5 2 2.50
Guinea 1.5 2.5 2 4.31
(Continued on next page)
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Table 18 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Corruption Law and Order Bureaucracy Institutions
Guyana 1.5 1.5 3 5.11
Honduras 1.5 1.5 2 2.50
Hong Kong 4.5 5 3 2.11
Hungary 3 4 3 1.09
Iceland 5 6 4 3.52
India 2.5 4 3 1.12
Indonesia 3 3 2 1.25
Iran 1.5 4 2 2.03
Iraq 1 1.5 1.5 4.93
Israel 3.5 5 4 2.11
Italy 2.5 4 2.5 1.10
Jamaica 2 2 3 1.91
Japan 4.5 5 4 2.72
Jordan 2.5 4 2 1.15
Kazakhstan 1.5 3.5 2 1.82
Kenya 1.5 2 2 2.05
Kuwait 2.5 5 2 1.36
Latvia 2.5 5 2.5 1.29
Lebanon 1.5 4 2 1.42
Liberia 2.5 2.5 0 5.85
Libya 1 4 1 2.51
Lithuania 2.5 4 2.5 1.09
Luxembourg 5 6 4 3.69
Malawi 2 2.5 2.5 1.76
Malaysia 2.5 4 3 1.11
Mali 1.5 3 0 3.79
Malta 3.5 5 3 1.44
Mexico 2 1.5 3 2.28
Moldova 2 4.5 1 0.13
Mongolia 2 4 2 1.59
Morocco 2 4.5 2 1.40
Namibia 3 5 2 1.33
Netherlands 5 6 4 4.24
New Zealand 5.5 5.5 4 3.88
Nicaragua 1.5 3.5 1 2.78
Niger 1.5 2 1.5 1.01
Nigeria 1.5 2 1 2.58
Norway 5.5 6 4 4.26
Oman 2.5 5 2 1.25
Pakistan 2 3.5 2 1.41
Panama 2 3 2 1.46
Paraguay 1.5 2 1 4.99
Peru 2 3 2 1.49
Philippines 2 2.5 3 1.59
Poland 3 4.5 3 1.25
Portugal 3.5 5 3 1.52
Qatar 3 5 2 1.27
Romania 2 4 1 1.88
(Continued on next page)
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Table 18 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Corruption Law and Order Bureaucracy Institutions
Saudi Arabia 2.5 5 2 1.32
Senegal 2 3 1 5.10
Sierra Leone 1.5 3.5 0 3.32
Singapore 4.5 5 4 2.60
Slovenia 3.5 4.5 3 1.34
South Africa 2.5 2.5 2 1.39
Spain 4 5 3 1.83
Sri Lanka 2.5 2.5 2 1.49
Sudan 0.5 2.5 1 4.55
Sweden 5.5 6 4 4.27
Switzerland 5 5 4 3.18
Syria 1.5 4.5 1.5 2.04
Taiwan 3 5 3 1.32
Tanzania 2 5 1 2.08
Thailand 2 2.5 2 1.69
Togo 1.5 3 0 1.21
Tunisia 2.5 5 2 1.10
Turkey 2.5 3.5 2 1.19
Uganda 1.5 3.5 2 2.04
Ukraine 1.5 4 1 2.59
United Kingdom 4.5 5 4 3.13
United States 4 5 4 2.68
Uruguay 4 2.5 2 1.70
Venezuela 1 1 1 3.87
Vietnam 2.5 4 2 1.19
Zambia 2.5 4 1 1.73
Zimbabwe 1 3 1.5 3.20
Average 2.68 3.77 2.32 2.21
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Table 19: Summary Statistics of Main Regression Variables.
Panel A: Country-Level Measures
N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Culturei 56 1.77 1.71 1.00 0.00 3.85
Poweri 79 2.19 0.91 3.21 0.00 19.86
Individualismi 79 1.89 0.77 2.39 0.00 10.00
Masculinityi 79 1.62 0.73 2.12 0.00 10.36
Uncert. Aviod.i 79 2.05 0.87 2.66 0.00 15.35
Long-Term Orient.i 61 1.39 0.62 1.74 0.00 7.44
Indulgencei 56 2.01 0.90 3.17 0.00 19.53
Institutions j−i 112 2.09 1.51 1.98 0.05 9.20
Corruptioni 112 2.28 0.68 2.81 0.00 10.95
Lawi 112 2.07 1.30 2.47 0.00 11.72
Bureaucracyi 112 1.93 0.82 2.21 0.00 13.15
Panel B: Country-Pair Measures
N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Initiationi j 3844 0.30 0.01 1.58 0.00 49.13
Completioni j 2007 0.79 0.81 0.18 0.14 1.00
Durationi j 2007 43.60 0.00 155.34 0.00 3653.00
∆Culture j−i 3844 1.97 1.84 1.13 0.07 6.89
∆Power j−i 3844 1.85 0.91 2.46 0.00 20.68
∆Individualism j−i 3844 2.14 1.06 2.45 0.00 12.02
∆Masculinity j−i 3844 2.29 1.01 3.20 0.00 25.29
∆Uncert. Aviod. j−i 3844 1.93 0.87 2.56 0.00 21.75
∆Long-Term Orient. j−i 3844 1.74 0.90 2.18 0.00 12.92
∆Indulgence j−i 3844 1.89 0.95 2.43 0.00 18.38
∆Institutions j−i 3844 1.84 1.22 1.78 0.00 9.20
Corruptioni 3844 3.28 2.50 1.27 1.50 5.50
Lawi 3844 4.17 4.50 1.27 1.50 6.00
Bureaucracyi 3844 2.81 3.00 0.92 1.00 4.00
Corruption j 3844 3.30 2.75 1.27 1.50 5.50
Law j 3844 4.18 4.50 1.28 1.50 6.00
Bureaucracy j 3844 2.84 3.00 0.90 1.00 4.00
Sizei j 3844 −8.51 0.04 49.38 −1694.95 1.00
∆Language j−i 3844 0.95 1.00 0.22 0.00 1.00
∆Religion j−i 3844 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
∆Distance j−i 3844 8.57 8.89 0.95 4.39 9.89
Experiencei j 3844 0.19 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00
This table presents the summary statistics of our dependent and independent variables of interest. We include both the
country-level summary in Panel A and the country-pair data that is actually used in our regressions in Panel B.
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Table 20: Correlation Table.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
(1) 1
(2) 0.99* 1
(3) 0.02 0.02 1
(4) −0.12* −0.19* 0.01 1
(5) −0.06* −0.10* 0.05* 0.52* 1
(6) −0.07* −0.12* 0.03 0.53* 0.35* 1
(7) −0.02 −0.05* −0.00 0.51* 0.11* 0.00 1
(8) −0.04* −0.08* −0.01 0.32* 0.01 0.01 −0.01 1
(9) −0.07* −0.08* −0.02 0.35* −0.07* 0.05* 0.01 −0.10* 1
(10) −0.07* −0.09* −0.04 0.40* −0.02 0.05* −0.00 −0.08* 0.20* 1
(11) −0.10* −0.16* 0.02 0.38* 0.42* 0.37* 0.09* 0.01 0.03* 0.09* 1
(12) 0.12* 0.13* −0.03 0.13* 0.11* 0.10* 0.19* 0.10* −0.06* −0.14* 0.11* 1
(13) 0.09* 0.10* −0.03 0.10* 0.12* 0.05* 0.19* 0.09* −0.08* −0.17* 0.02 0.74* 1
(14) 0.14* 0.16* −0.01 0.17* 0.13* 0.09* 0.21* 0.11* −0.04* −0.12* 0.05* 0.82* 0.69* 1
(15) 0.16* 0.12* 0.01 0.15* 0.14* 0.10* 0.19* 0.11* −0.07* −0.14* 0.13* −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 1
(16) 0.13* 0.10* 0.01 0.10* 0.13* 0.05* 0.19* 0.09* −0.08* −0.17* 0.03 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 0.74* 1
(17) 0.19* 0.16* 0.03 0.18* 0.17* 0.10* 0.20* 0.12* −0.05* −0.11* 0.08* −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 0.82* 0.70* 1
(18) 0.02 0.02 0.01 −0.00 0.05* −0.03* −0.05* 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 −0.09* −0.06* −0.14* 0.04* −0.01 0.06* 1
(19) −0.19* −0.24* −0.05 0.09* −0.01 −0.07* 0.12* 0.10* 0.09* −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.03 −0.02 0.01 0.03 −0.01 0.02 1
(20) −0.09* −0.11* −0.02 0.07* 0.06* 0.07* −0.05* 0.02 0.08* 0.04* −0.00 −0.16* −0.21* −0.08* −0.07* −0.05* −0.07* 0.08* 0.07* 1
(21) −0.15* −0.15* 0.03 0.17* 0.09* 0.21* −0.11* 0.11* 0.07* 0.13* 0.18* −0.09* −0.23* −0.12* −0.09* −0.22* −0.12* −0.02 −0.02 0.16* 1
(22) 0.08* −0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.09* 0.04* 0.01 −0.08* −0.09* 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.04* 0.24* 0.21* 0.28* 0.01 −0.08* −0.03* −0.21* 1
(1) Initiationi j (12) Corruptioni
(2) Completioni j (13) Law and Orderi
(3) Durationi j (14) Bureaucracyi
(4) ∆Culture j−i (15) Corruption j
(5) ∆Power j−i (16) Law and Order j
(6) ∆Individualism j−i (17) Bureaucracy j
(7) ∆Masculinity j−i (18) ∆Size j−i
(8) ∆Uncert. Aviod. j−i (19) ∆Language j−i
(9) ∆Long-Term Orientation j−i (20) ∆Religion j−i
(10) ∆Indulgence j−i (21) Distancei j
(11) ∆Institutions j−i (22) Experiencei j
This table presents the correlation matrix between our dependent and independent variables of interest. Significance at 10% is denoted by (*).
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Table 21: Cross-section of Deal Initiations.
Fractional Logit PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experiencei j 0.287*** 0.289*** 0.985*** 0.279*** 0.276*** 0.981***
(0.099) (0.109) (0.108) (0.076) (0.085) (0.092)
∆Language j−i −0.822*** −0.905*** −0.938*** −0.762*** −0.830*** −0.873***
(0.125) (0.130) (0.111) (0.087) (0.090) (0.093)
∆Religion j−i −0.236* −0.306** −0.048 −0.234** −0.313*** −0.056
(0.132) (0.145) (0.132) (0.107) (0.121) (0.094)
∆Distance j−i −0.853*** −0.909*** −0.996*** −0.784*** −0.839*** −0.930***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
∆GDP j−i 0.000** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Power j−i −0.013 −0.013
(0.019) (0.016)
∆Indv. j−i −0.029 −0.026*
(0.021) (0.015)
∆Masc. j−i −0.062*** −0.060***
(0.011) (0.008)
∆Uncert. Aviod. j−i −0.134*** −0.131***
(0.020) (0.013)
∆Long Term Orient. j−i −0.060** −0.060***
(0.029) (0.022)
∆Indulgence j−i −0.054** −0.052***
(0.027) (0.019)
∆Corruption j−i −0.050** −0.050***
(0.024) (0.018)
∆Law j−i 0.007 0.002
(0.024) (0.019)
∆Bureaucracy j−i 0.030 0.036
(0.037) (0.032)
Acquirer Fixed Effect ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Target Fixed Effect ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Obs. 8,813 7,862 3,844 8,736 7,787 3,844
pseudo R2 0.347 0.346 0.233 0.749 0.760 0.748
The dependent variables is the number of cross-border acquisitions from acquirer country j to target
country i relative to the total number of cross-border acquisitions for acquirer country j . We use a
logit fractional response and PPML model to estimate the cross sectional regressions. These measures
are constructed using the Mahalanobis method restricting the covariance terms to zero following
Kogut and Singh (1988). Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by (*, **, ***) with standard errors
clustered on the target countries in parentheses.
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Table 22: Cross-section of Deal Completions.
Fractional Logit PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experiencei j −0.027 −0.062 −0.072 −0.006 −0.010 −0.014
(0.071) (0.076) (0.107) (0.010) (0.011) (0.021)
∆Language j−i 0.128 0.057 0.092 0.020 0.009 0.018
(0.086) (0.088) (0.121) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021)
∆Religion j−i −0.025 −0.004 0.147 0.001 0.003 0.035
(0.077) (0.080) (0.145) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022)
∆Distance j−i 0.276*** 0.284*** 0.234*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.051***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.045) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
∆GDP j−i −0.000 −0.001* −0.000 −0.000***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Power j−i 0.013 0.004
(0.015) (0.003)
∆Indv. j−i −0.044*** −0.010***
(0.014) (0.003)
∆Masc. j−i −0.016** −0.003*
(0.008) (0.001)
∆Uncert. Aviod. j−i −0.002 0.000
(0.012) (0.002)
∆Long Term Orient. j−i 0.006 0.001
(0.019) (0.003)
∆Indulgence j−i 0.016 0.003
(0.017) (0.003)
∆Corruption j−i −0.002 0.000
(0.023) (0.004)
∆Law j−i 0.015 0.002
(0.023) (0.004)
∆Bureaucracy j−i −0.079** −0.017***
(0.034) (0.006)
Acquirer Fixed Effect ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Target Fixed Effect ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Obs. 5,281 4,586 2,002 5,281 4,586 2,002
(pseudo) R2 0.090 0.085 0.044 0.269 0.270 0.212
The dependent variables is the proportion of completed cross-border acquisitions from acquirer
country j to target country i relative to the number of cross-border acquisitions from from acquirer
country j to target country i . We use a logit fractional response model to estimate the cross sectional
regressions. These measures are constructed using the Mahalanobis method restricting the covariance
terms to zero following Kogut and Singh (1988). Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by (*, **,
***) with standard errors clustered on the target countries in parentheses.
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Table 23: Cross-section of Deal Duration.
Fractional Logit PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experiencei j −3.466 −4.371 8.354 −0.051 −0.062 0.216
(4.846) (5.411) (8.137) (0.098) (0.106) (0.189)
∆Language j−i 10.810 11.970 −0.549 0.191* 0.204* 0.016
(7.161) (8.620) (9.699) (0.109) (0.120) (0.178)
∆Religion j−i −4.007 −3.969 −13.490* −0.092 −0.099 −0.347*
(5.657) (5.897) (7.515) (0.105) (0.108) (0.183)
∆Distance j−i 1.009 0.506 −4.521** 0.027 0.013 −0.092*
(1.908) (2.212) (2.149) (0.036) (0.037) (0.048)
∆GDP j−i 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Power j−i 2.028 0.058**
(1.452) (0.028)
∆Indv. j−i 0.569 0.006
(1.170) (0.021)
∆Masc. j−i 0.201 0.008
(0.325) (0.012)
∆Uncert. Aviod. j−i 0.430 0.010
(0.861) (0.017)
∆Long Term Orient. j−i −0.239 −0.002
(0.983) (0.027)
∆Indulgence j−i −1.800 −0.046
(1.413) (0.035)
∆Corruption j−i −0.347 −0.011
(1.148) (0.034)
∆Law j−i −1.023 −0.020
(1.822) (0.031)
∆Bureaucracy j−i 2.617 0.057
(2.590) (0.053)
Acquirer Fixed Effect ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Target Fixed Effect ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Obs. 5,284 4,588 2,001 5,200 4,520 1,991
(pseudo) R2 0.170 0.187 0.097 0.265 0.306 0.130
The dependent variables is the average difference between the announcement date and effective date
for each acquirer-target pair. We use an OLS model to estimate the cross sectional regressions. These
measures are constructed using the Mahalanobis method restricting the covariance terms to zero fol-
lowing Kogut and Singh (1988). Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by (*, **, ***) with standard
errors clustered on the target countries in parentheses.
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Table 24: Robustness to Prior Experience.
Initiation Completion Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FL PPML FL OLS PPML
Experiencei j −0.079 −0.077 0.218 9.709 0.322
( 0.119) ( 0.091) ( 0.200) ( 7.858) ( 0.237)
∆Language j−i −0.026 −0.025 −0.009 −0.353 −0.012
( 0.018) ( 0.016) ( 0.034) ( 0.882) ( 0.036)
∆Religion j−i −0.056** −0.055*** −0.009 −0.056 −0.003
( 0.026) ( 0.017) ( 0.027) ( 0.916) ( 0.030)
∆Distance j−i −0.049*** −0.047*** 0.045** −0.117 −0.005
( 0.013) ( 0.011) ( 0.018) ( 0.430) ( 0.017)
∆GDP j−i −0.042* −0.041*** −0.034 0.136 0.006
( 0.022) ( 0.015) ( 0.024) ( 0.935) ( 0.022)
∆Power j−i −0.094*** −0.092*** 0.072* −0.064 −0.003
( 0.036) ( 0.033) ( 0.042) ( 1.209) ( 0.039)
∆Indv. j−i −0.041 −0.040 −0.012 −0.294 −0.009
( 0.032) ( 0.030) ( 0.038) ( 1.347) ( 0.039)
∆Masc. j−i −0.093*** −0.091*** 0.130*** 0.235 0.008
( 0.027) ( 0.024) ( 0.021) ( 1.256) ( 0.046)
∆Uncert. Aviod. j−i 0.022 0.021 −0.013 0.599 0.018
( 0.038) ( 0.028) ( 0.034) ( 1.342) ( 0.036)
∆Long Term Orient. j−i −0.057 −0.054 −0.070 1.536 0.050
( 0.047) ( 0.039) ( 0.048) ( 1.382) ( 0.053)
∆Indulgence j−i −0.813*** −0.771*** 0.168 1.519 0.060
( 0.142) ( 0.143) ( 0.171) ( 3.574) ( 0.171)
∆Corruption j−i −0.285*** −0.273*** −0.064 5.292 0.196
( 0.082) ( 0.085) ( 0.114) ( 3.614) ( 0.149)
∆Law j−i −0.205*** −0.196*** −0.013 0.639 0.027
( 0.057) ( 0.041) ( 0.057) ( 1.640) ( 0.065)
∆Bureaucracy j−i −0.002** −0.002*** −0.002 0.039 0.003
( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.002) ( 0.024) ( 0.003)
∆Completion Exp. j−i 0.256 0.244 2.177*** −17.510 −0.606
( 0.281) ( 0.255) ( 0.554) (22.390) ( 0.601)
∆Duration Exp.i j −0.001 −0.001
( 0.001) ( 0.001)
Constant −0.647 −0.805* −0.314 26.890 3.238***
( 0.578) ( 0.476) ( 0.746) (19.570) ( 0.692)
Obs. 899 899 781 781 781
(pseudo) R2 0.049 0.268 0.029 — —
The dependent variables is the average difference between the announcement date and effective
date for each acquirer-target pair. We use an OLS model to estimate the cross sectional regres-
sions. These measures are constructed using the Mahalanobis method restricting the covariance
terms to zero following Kogut and Singh (1988). Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by (*,
**, ***) with standard errors clustered on the target countries in parentheses.
73
Table 25: Robustness using Different Measures of Dis-
tance.
(1) (2) (3)
Initiationi j Completioni j Durationi j
∆Culture j−i −0.131* −0.117 −3.449
( 0.075) ( 0.074) ( 5.269)
∆Geography j−i −0.354*** −0.332*** 0.999
( 0.040) ( 0.062) ( 3.746)
∆Administrative j−i −0.207*** −0.233*** −3.069
( 0.025) ( 0.047) ( 2.323)
∆Demographic j−i −0.398*** −0.355*** 4.214
( 0.044) ( 0.077) ( 5.514)
∆Political j−i −0.040 −0.238*** −6.959
( 0.037) ( 0.091) ( 4.915)
∆Economic j−i −0.194*** −0.061 3.165
( 0.054) ( 0.065) ( 2.779)
∆Financial j−i 0.090*** 0.187*** −4.515
( 0.035) ( 0.054) ( 3.835)
∆Integration j−i 0.064* −0.128** 8.009
( 0.038) ( 0.057) ( 5.120)
∆Innovation j−i 0.071*** 0.253*** −5.271***
( 0.015) ( 0.026) ( 1.839)
Constant 0.058 4.859*** 160.900***
( 0.328) ( 0.555) (32.740)
N 5,938 5,938 2,032
(Pseudo) R2 0.051 0.118 0.012
The dependent variables are: (1) Initiationi j : the number of cross-border acquisi-
tions from acquirer country j to target country i relative to the total number of
cross-border acquisitions for acquirer country j ; (2) Completioni j : the proportion
of completed cross-border acquisitions from acquirer country j to target country i
relative to the number of cross-border acquisitions from from acquirer country j to
target country i ; and (3) Durationi j : the average difference between the announce-
ment date and effective date for each acquirer-target pair, removing acquisitions
with the same announcement and effective date. We use a logit fractional response
model for models (1) and (2) and an OLS model for model (3). The cross-national
distance measures are from Berry, Guillen, and Zhou (2010). ∆Culture j−i mea-
sures the log difference in attitudes toward authority, trust, individuality, and the
importance of work and family. ∆Geography j−i is the log great circle distance be-
tween the geographic center of each country. ∆Administrative j−i measures the log
differences in colonial ties, language, religion, and legal systems. ∆Demographic j−i
measures the differences in demographic characteristics. ∆Political j−i measures
the differences in political stability, democracy, and trade-bloc membership.
∆Economic j−i measures the difference in economic development and macroeco-
nomic characteristics. ∆Financial j−i measures the difference in financial sector
development. ∆Integration j−i measures the differences in tourism and internet us-
age. ∆Innovation j−i measures the differences in patents and scientific production.
These measures are constructed using the Mahalanobis method. Time-varying dis-
tance measures use the time-varying covariance matrix in computing the distance
and are averaged across each acquirer-target pair. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
is denoted by (*, **, ***) with t-statistics based on standard errors clustered on 84
target countries in parentheses.
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3 The Impact of Terrorism on Cross-Border Acquisition Flows
The terrorist attack of 9/11, the instability of the Middle East and Northern Africa, and the
subsequentmassmigration of a large portion of its populace to Europe has brought terrorism
to the forefront of the West’s conscience after a period of relative peace in the 1990s. Figure 7
shows terrorism, at the worldwide level, has had two periods of severe growth since the 1970s.
The first is the period starting in the early 1970s and ending in the early 1990s and the second
is the period starting in the early 2000s to the present day. Over the period starting from
1970 to 1990, there was an annual growth rate of 9.34% over the period starting from 1990 to
2000, there was an annual growth of 7.34%; and over the most recent period there has been
a growth rate of 15.03% per annum.24 How might this increasing trend of terrorism impact
economic activity between countries?
Classical economic theory predicts that terrorism will not have a substantial effect on
economic activity since it affects a small proportion of a country’s total capital stock (Becker
& Murphy, 2001). However, more recent empirical work has overturned this view, showing
that terrorism has large impacts on economic outcomes (e.g., Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003).
Researchers who study the effect of terrorism on international trade, however, have not come
to a general agreement that it impacts trade by reducing the volume of trade between import-
ing and exporting countries. On the one hand, early work found empirical evidence that
terrorism reduces the volume of trade between importing and exporting countries (Nitsch
& Schumacher, 2004). On the other hand, theoretical work has shown that terrorism may
either increase or decrease trade depending on the impact that terrorism has on the terms of
trade between exporters and importers (Bandyopadhyay & Sandler, 2014).
Given these large increases in terrorism and the possibility of economic effects, it is also
imperative to understand the impact on corporate decision. This essay fills this existing gap
24The growth rate g of the log number of terrorist attacks between years s and k is given by 1 + g =
exp(τs −τk )1/∆t where ∆t = k − s.
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in the literature by studying the causal impact of terrorism on cross-border acquisition flows.
How might terrorism affect the decision to initiate an acquisition? Let’s look at a rough ex-
ample to see what the effects might be. Turkey has seen a tremendous surge in terrorist
attacks, increasing from 421 attacks in 2015 to 540 attacks in 2016 (28% increase). Over this
same period, the total number of mergers and acquisitions has decreased from 319 initiated
acquisitions to 243 acquisitions (24% decrease) (Ernest and Young, 2015, 2016).
In this essay, we provide a stylized theoretical model of how terrorism influences cross
border mergers and then empirically test its predictions. Our model predicts that higher lev-
els of terrorism in the target country are associated with smaller cross border initiations. We
empirically test this prediction by exploiting the exogenous variation induced by ethnic and
religious fractionalization and genetic diversity. Our empirical results confirm our theoret-
ical prediction, where we show that a 1% increase in terrorism in the target country relative
to the acquirer country is related to a 9% decrease in acquistion flows. We further test the
differential impact that domestic and transnational terrorism have on acquisition flows. We
find that both domestic and transnational terrorism have a negative and significant impact
on acquisition flows but the economic significance is larger for transnational terrorist attacks.
3.1 Literature Review
3.1.1 Terrorism
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational
groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience
beyond that of the immediate noncombatant victims (Enders and Sandler, 2012, p.4). The
strategic value in terrorism lies in the the unpredictable nature of the attack, making everyone
feel in danger even if the probability of any one person being a victim is as small as drowning
in a bathtub (Mueller, 2006). By traumatizing the public through brutal acts, terrorists seek to
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compel the government to address their demands or diverting funds into protecting potential
targets.
For example, 9/11 hijackings were bent on pressuring the USA to remove its troops from
Saudi Arabia and intimidated a global audience. The attacks caused temporary losses to
the major stock exchanges (Chen and Siems, 2004), and created $80–90 billion in damages
(Kunreuther andHeal, 2003). Even though stock exchanges recovered lost values in just over
a month, the death of almost 3,000 people caused rich industrial countries to allocate more
resources to counterterrorism, shook insurance markets, and made an indelible impression
on virtually the entire world.
Research has found some rather interesting stylized facts. Terrorist campaigns are more
prevalent in liberal democracies, where the government’s legitimacy hinges on its ability to
protect the lives and property of its citizens (Eubank and Weinberg, 1994). Terrorist groups
were primarily nationalists/separatists or leftists (socialists) during the late 1960s until the
late 1980s (Rapoport, 2004). Even the Palestinian terrorists were secular until the end of the
1980s with the rise of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other groups. After the mid-
1990s, the religious fundamentalists came to dominate and increased the carnage (Enders
and Sandler, 2000; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2014).25
3.1.2 Mergers and Acquisition
In the second essay, we show that culture, institutions, and geography are important deter-
minants in the initiation and completion of cross-border acquisitions using a gravity model.
More specifically, culture differences, institutional, and geographical distance are of paramount
importance in whether firms decide to initiate cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Cul-
tural and geographic distance do not play a large role in determining whether firms follow
25The phenomenon of religious-based transnational terrorism is not novel and can be traced back to the
Sicarii or Zealots, a Jewish sect that conducted a terror campaign against the Romans and their Jewish collab-
orators in Judea from CE 48 to 73 (Bloom, 2005).
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through and complete the deal; what matters in the completion of initiated deals are institu-
tional differences. The duration from initiation to completion is unaffected by any institu-
tional, cultural, or geographical factors and solely depends on idiosyncratic factors.
Other work in this area has been founded empirically on the gravity model from trade
when studying different factors. Rossi and Volipin (2004) find that the volume of cross-
country acquisitions is larger in countries with stronger accounting standards and stronger
shareholder protection. In a similar vein, Erel, Liao, andWeisbach (2013) find that geographic
distance and differences in various institutional factors – such as accounting disclosures and
economic development – are positively related to cross-border acquisition flows between
countries. Ahern et al. (2015) isolates the impact of culture on cross-border acquisitions.
They find that countries that are more distant culturally have lower cross-border acquisition
activity. Additionally, the literature has documented that in countries with far-right parties
or in times of weak government there is more intervention in large-scale foreign acquisitions
(Serdar Dinc and Erel, 2014).
However, there is no systematic study that tries tomeasure the causal impact of terrorism
on cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
3.2 Theoretical Predictions
In this section, we adapt the model of Helpman et al. (2008) following Bandyopadhyay et al.
(2016) to examine the impact that terrorism has on cross-border acquisition to motivate our
hypotheses.
Consider a world with J countries, index by j = 1, . . . , J with ∑Jj=1 N j firms in the world.
Each country acquires a continuum of firms, indexed by f , with a set of domestic and foreign
firms F j available for acquisition by country j . The standard utility function that character-
izes the acquirer country j ’s acquisition preference is
U j =
[∫
f ∈F j
x j
(
f
)α d f ] 1α , (28)
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where x j ( f ) is the acquisition of firm l in country j and α is the parameter that determines
the elasticity of substitution across firms, which is given by ε= 1(1−α) , ε> 1. This elasticity is
the same across countries.
Using standard utility maximization arguments, country j ’s optimal demand for acquir-
ing firm f is
x∗j ( f ) =
p j ( f )−εY j
P 1−εj
, (29)
where Y j is the income/expenditure of country j and P 1−εj is the country’s ideal price index,
or the aggregation of the acquisition price of each firm f ,
P j =
[∫
f ∈B j
p j ( f )
1−εd f
] 1
(1−ε)
. (30)
This specification implies that every firm f has a constant demand elasticity ε.
Themarginal domestic acquisition cost of any firm in country i is a constant ci , while the
productivity of firm f is a( f ) such that the firm’s marginal cost is ci /a( f ). An acquiring firm
also incurs an additional fixed costφi j and conversion cost ξi j for cross-border acquisitions.
The conversion cost is defined such that for each acquisition in target country i , the firm
needs to acquire ιi j units for one unit to actually become acquired. It is assumed that ι j j = 1
and ιi j > 1.
Terrorism in target country i , τi , increases the cross-border acquisition conversion cost
such that
ξi j = ξi j (τi )
∂ξi j
∂τi
> 0. (31)
That is, we assume that an increases of terrorism in the target country make it more costly to
initiate cross-border acquisitions. As is standard in the literature (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Helpman
et al., 2008), we also assume that there is a fixed cost for a firm from nation j to acquire a
firm in nation i , denoted φi j . This cost is likely to be affected by terrorism in the acquiring
country i , hence,
ξi j = ξi j (τi ). (32)
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The profit, πi j , of a firm in country i which is acquired by a firm in country j is
πi j = x j ( f )
[
p j ( f )− ci
a( f )
ξi j (τi )
]
−φi j (τi ). (33)
Equating the marginal revenue and marginal cost gives the acquisition and price levels,
p j ( f )
(
1− 1
ε
)
= ci
a( f )
ξi j (τi )
p j ( f ) = ε
1−ε ·
ci
a( f )
·ξi j (τi )
≡ p j ( f ;τi ).
(34)
Substituting Equation (34) into Equation (29), we can obtain the value of acquisitions from
target country i to acquiring country j ,
Vi j
(
a( f );τi ,P j ,Y j
)= p j ( f ,τi ,τ j ) ·x j ( f )
=
[
p j (·)
P j
]1−ε
Y j .
(35)
The profit of firm f from acquisition by country j can be expressed as
πi j ( f ,τi ,P j ,Y j ) =
[
ciξi j (·)
a( f )
]1−ε µY j
P 1−εj
−φi j (·) (36)
where µ= ε−ε (ε−1)ε−1. Note that positive acquisition profit can be obtained if and only if
a ≥ ãi j (τi ,P j ,Y j ) =
ci ·ξi j (τi )
P j
[
φi j (τi )
µY j
]1/(ε−1)
, (37)
where ã is the threshold synergy (i.e. productivity) level required for profitable acquisitions.
We assume that terrorism, τi , affects the productivity distribution of acquisitions in coun-
try i , denoted by g (a;τi ) with support (0,∞). An increase in terrorism causes adverse pro-
ductivity effects (i.e., leftward shifts in the density function). Given a measure Ni of firms in
country i , the aggregate volume from target country i to acquiring country j is26
26A gravity equation can be derived from Equation (38) that involves the terrorism parameters of both
nations i and j . See Appendix II of Helpman et al. (2008) for the method of derivation.
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Ṽi j (τi ,P j ,Y j ) =
∫ ∞
ãi j
Vi j
(
a;τi ,P j (τi ),Y j
) ·Ni · g (a;τi ) d a (38)
By differentiating this equation with respect to any terrorism related parameter ϑ, we get
∂Ṽi j (·)
∂ϑ
= Ni
∫ ∞
ãi j
∂Vi j (a;τi )
∂ϑ
· g (·) d a
+Ni
∫ ∞
ãi j
Vi j (·) · ∂g (a;τi )
∂ϑ
d a
−Ni ·Vi j (ãi j ) · g (ãi j ;τi ) ·
∂ãi j
∂ϑ
(39)
Proposition 3.1. An increase of terrorism in target country i decreases acquisitions from ac-
quirer country j .
Remark. In the first term of Equation (39), an increase in terrorism τi will increase the ac-
quisition price of a firm p j through an increase of the conversion costs ξi j (see Equation 34).
Since the acquisitions from target country i are likely to be relatively a small subset of all firms
in the acquiring country j , we can safely ignore the impact on the aggregate price index P j .
Therefore, the relative price of acquisitions increase (p j /P j ) produced by the increase in ter-
rorism causes the optimal demand, and hence, the volume of acquisitions to decrease (see
Equation 35).
An increase in terrorismτi will reduce the productivity distribution of acquisitions. There-
fore, the second term will also cause the volume of acquisitions to decrease.
Lastly, the increase in the conversion costs ξi j will cause the threshold synergy level re-
quired for profitable acquisitions to increase (see Equation 37). Therefore the rise of ãi j will
imply that the third term also decreases acquisition volume from j .
3.3 Methodology
In this section, we present a simple expositive linear model to understand why we may need
an instrument to consistently estimate the causal impact of terrorism on acquisition flows.
81
We then posit three measures of societal fragmentation that are correlated with terrorism
and not correlated with the error term that allow us to exploit exogenous variation. Finally,
we discuss in more detail as to how we estimate our model using a multiplicative gravity
equation that has been used extensively in other economic work to measure flows between
bilateral country pairs.
3.3.1 Correlation or Causation?
We model the initiation of cross-border acquisition deals between an acquirer-target pair i
as
yi = κ+α ·τi +ui , (40)
where τi is the difference in terrorist attacks between the acquirer and target countries, ui is
an error term, and α is the elasticity parameter of interest. This estimation of α is consistent
only if the regressors τi is uncorrelated with the error term ui .
However, it could be argued that an endogenous relationship exists between the error
term and our regressor of interest. For example, the error term symbolizes all factors other
than terrorism and observable country characteristics that determine cross-border acquisi-
tion initiations. Suppose a country has a high level of political or religious fanaticism due to
the schooling system. The schooling system of the country also determine the cross-border
acquisition initiations by influencing human capital. This association between the error term
and the regressor of interest will confound the estimate of the effect of terrorism.27
By taking into account observable characteristicswe can, at the very least, partially resolve
this problem. If we supplement our specification with a vector of observable characteristics
yi = κ+α ·τi +γ ·xi +εi , (41)
27To see this intuitively, if the error term and terrorism are related, then we can rewrite (1) as y =α ·τ+u(τ)
abstracting away from indices and the constant. Then the total derivative is d ydτ =α+ dudτ . The estimation from
the data gives us d ydτ , which means it estimates α+ dudτ rather than α alone. Therefore the estimates are biased
and inconsistent unless there is no relationship between τ and u.
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it will allow us to estimate the relationship between terrorism and acquisition deal initia-
tions while controlling for observed country characteristics that are likely to determine both
the amount of terrorism and the number of deal initiations. This will lead to unbiased and
consistent estimates of α if and only if E(ε ·τ) = 0. In practice this is not likely to be the case.
3.3.2 Identification
To consistently estimate the relationship between terrorism and acquisition initiation, we
exploit the exogenous variation in τi generated by instruments that are (i) correlated with
terrorism and (ii) plausibly uncorrelated with the error term. The instruments that we use
are the differences between the acquirer-target pair in ethnic and religious fractionalization
and the difference in aggregate genetic distance between the pair. Intuitively, there should
be a strong correlation link between the fragmentation of a country’s population (ethnically,
religiously, and genetically) and intersocietal conflict due to lack of social cohesion. This has
been empirically verified both in the prior literature (Abadie, 2006; Arbatli, Ashraf, Galor,
and Klemp, 2018) and in our own tests. Therefore, the first condition is satisfied. Since our
three instruments overidentify the estimation equations, we are able to statistically test the
assumption that the instruments are independent of the error term using the Sargan-Hansen
test. The empirical results from this tests is evidence that the instruments plausibly satisfy
the second condition. Therefore, we feel that our three instruments meet the two-conditions
necessary for valid inferences using instrumental variables.28
28Of course, the exclusion restriction assumption is the hardest one to defend. As an additional robustness
test to verify that our results are not spurious, we conduct a placebo test in which we keep only observations
with a low difference (≤ 0.50) in the number of terror attacks between the acquirer-target country and regress
the acquisition variable on all of our regressors excluding the terrorism variable. Our results show that our three
instruments are not statistically different from zero, giving us further support for the validity of the exclusion
restriction.
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3.3.3 Estimation
We use two alternative approaches to estimate our parameter of interest via a gravity equa-
tion. We are motivated by trade studies using the gravity equation model in which exports
between countries are proportional to the product of the two countries’ GDPs and are in-
versely proportional to factors that might create frictions. Firstly, we use a traditional two-
stage least squares (2sls). However, 2sls could lead to inefficient and inconsistent estimation
of the gravity model.
To understand why, let’s rewrite our simple expositive model in Equation 1 in its expo-
nential form with multiplicative errors following Tenreyo (2007),
yi = exp(xiβ)εi . (42)
While one may be tempted to log-linearize the gravity model and estimate β by OLS, it is not
advisable. Firstly, the dependent variable may contain a large number of zeroes, which make
OLS infeasible. Secondly, the log-linearized error termwill, in general, be correlated with the
covariates and lead to inconsistent estimates.29 Non-linear least squares (NLS) would seem
to be the most natural estimation technique, and has been shown to be an asymptotically
valid estimator for Equation 42. However, since it gives more weight to noisier observations
it is considerably inefficient. Therefore, in our second approach we use the (ppml) method
proposed by Santos Silva andTenreyro (2006) to directly estimate themultiplicativemodel.30
The PPML estimator is given by
β̂= arg max
n∑
i
[
yi × (xiβ)−exp(xiβ)
]
, (43)
29The error term will generally be heteroskedastic and it’s variance will depend on the regressors. At first
glance it may be surprising that the heteroskedasticity of the error term can lead to inconsitency as well as
inefficiency, however, the nonlinearity of Equation (42) changes the properties of the error term in a nontrivial
way. See §3 of Silva and Tenrayo (2004) for more details.
30The PPML estimator gives each observation equal weight and the only requirement for consistency is for
the conditional mean to be correctly specified. Due to these desirable properties, it has become standard in the
trade literature.
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which means that the first order condition solved by the PPML estimator is
n∑
i
[
yi −exp(xiβ)
]
xi = 0. (44)
Consequently, the PPML estimator is a GMM estimator that solves the moment condition in
the above equation.
3.4 Data
To construct the cross-border acquisition flow variable, we use data from Thomson’s Securi-
tiesDataCorporation (SDC) PlatinumDatabase. The initial sample is comprised of 1,005,488
acquisitions from 1970 until June 2016. In line with the literature, we remove 61,830 deals in
which the acquirer or target nation data is missing or recorded as “unknown”. We addition-
ally remove 724,852 domestic acquisitions. Our final sample consists of 218, 806 cross-border
deals.
The data on terrorist attacks comes from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) main-
tained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START) led by the University ofMaryland. TheGTD dataset is comprised on publicly avail-
able, nonclassified source material, including media articles and electronic news archives,
and to a lesser extent, existing data sets, secondary source materials such as books and jour-
nals, and legal documents. The START team integrated and synthesized data collected across
the entire 1970?2015 time spanwith the goal of ensuring that the definitions andmethodology
are as consistent as possible.
The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and vio-
lence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear,
coercion, or intimidation. Therefore, for an attack to be included in the dataset it must be: (i)
intentional, (ii) level of violence or immediate threat of violence, and (iii) be subnational ac-
tors Additionally, at least two of the following three criteria must be met: (a) the act must be
aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal, (b) There must be evidence
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of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience than
the immediate victims, and (c) the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare
activities.
From this database, we use the log average number of terror attacks for each country.
Figure 8 plots the spatial distribution of log average terrorist attacks for each country from
1970 to 2015. Althoughwe can see that there seem to clusters within continents, these clusters
are pretty evenly distributed globally.
We also differentiate attacks between domestic and transnational (or international) ter-
rorist attacks following the terrorism literature (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev, 2011). Do-
mestic terrorism is defined as an attack in which the venue, target, and perpetrators are all
from the same country and should have effects only on the venue country. Since 1970, most
terrorist attacks are domestic in nature and are related to mostly leftist guerillas fighting the
governemnt (e.g., Shining Path in Peru, Naxalites in India). Through its victims, targets,
supporters, or perpetrators, transnational terrorism concerns more than a single country
(e.g., 9/11 hijackings). Although the total number of transnational attacks are since 1970 are
smaller, they have grown in importance since 1990 are mostly related to jihadist ideology.
Figure 9 plots the spatial distribution of log average relative domestic terrorist attacks for
each country from 1970 to 2015. We can see large concentrations of domestic attacks in the
developing world (South America, Africa, and Asia). These attacks are related to the mostly
communist-affiliated guerillas fighting against the ruling government. England however has
experienced mostly transnational terrorist attacks.
Our main variable of interest is defined as the difference in log terrorist attacks between
the target and the acquirer country ∆τ = τi −τ j . The sign of ∆τ allows for ordered com-
parison between the acquirer and the target. This variable can be thought of as the amount
of terrorism of target country j relative to acquiring country i . For example, if Israel has
τ = 4.5 while Mexico has τ = 3.5, then the difference is ∆τ =±1. The difference will have a
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positive sign if Israel is the target while the sign will be negative if Mexico is the target. The
sign captures if the target has more or less terrorism relative to the acquirer. We choose this
variable definition because it succinctly allows us to test our prediction while allowing us to
use an instrumental variable approach.31
We additionally consider several control variables that have been found to influence
cross-border merger and acquisition flows. The economic size of the acquirer and target
country are controlled for by using the log GDP; physical distance is controlled for using the
log geodesic distance between the main cities of the acquirer and target country; we also in-
cluded dummies to indicate if the countries share a border, if their official languages are the
same, if themajority religion of both countries are the same, if both countries share a colonial
link, if both countries share the same legal system; a categorical variable that is equal to zero
if both countries have access to the sea, 1 if one country is landlocked, or 2 if both countries
are landlocked. We also control for differences in the financial system that both countries
have, differences in culture, and differences in the institutional quality of the government.
In Table 26, we present the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. After
merging our acquisition database with the terrorism database, we are left with a (77 × 76)
matrix of ordered country pairs (5,852). When we merge in our controls and instrumental
variables, our sample drops to a (58 × 57) matrix of ordered country pairs (3,306). Table 27,
we present the correlationmatrix of our variables. We can see that there are large correlations
between overall terrorism and domestic terrorism, showing that domestic terrorism makes
up a larger proportion. Domestic terrorism is more correlated with smaller GDP relative to
transnational terrorism. As expected, better financial systems are correlated to higher GDP.
Finally, our instruments are also significantly correlated to total terrorism.
31As noted by Angrist and Pischke, models with multiple endogenous variables are difficult to identify and,
even if identifiable with good instruments, difficult to interpret.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Cross-sectional Results
Table 28 presents the results from naively estimating the projection of acquisition flows be-
tween the acquirer and target country on the relative difference in terrorism using OLS. The
first column reveals that a one percent increase in terrorism in the acquiring country rel-
ative to the target country is associated with a 8.4 percentage decrease in acquisition flows
between acquirer and target countries. As we supplement this univariate specification with
control variables, we see that this result remains statistically significant and the economics
significance becomes larger.
In Table 29, we present results when we use our instrument variables to control for pos-
sible endogeneity between acquisition flows and relative difference in terrorism and account
for the multiplicative theoretical specification of the gravity equation. Again we show a con-
sistently statistically significant and negative sign for our variable of interest. When we ac-
count for the correct model specification, we now see that we fail to reject the null that the
instruments are valid.
In order to test the exclusion restriction more directly, we employ the following falsifica-
tion strategy. The exlcusion restriction assumption states that the instruments do not have a
first-order effect on acquisition flows. Therefore, we regress acquisition flows on the instru-
mental variables for a subsample where the difference in terrorism is relatively low. If the
exclusion restriction doesn’t hold, we would expect to see the instruments to influence the
dependent variable. The results in Tables 30 and 31 provides evidence that there is no correla-
tion between the instrumental variables and the dependent variable without being mediated
by terrorism. This further evidence suggests that the plausability of our exclusion restriction
when coupled with the J-test.
In sum, all the results in this section are in-line with the predictions from our theoreti-
cal model. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions are more likely to involve acquirers from
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countries with less terrorism relative to the target. The results also show that acquisitions are
more likely to involve targets from countries with more terrorism relative to the target. This
results are due to the symmetric impact that terrorism has on the acquisition costs: terrorism
in the acquiring (target) country increasing (decreasing) acquisition costs.
3.5.2 Subsamples by Terrorism Type
Given evidence provided by the literature, there may be differential effects between domes-
tic terror attacks (attacks perpetrated by domestic groups aimed at domestic targets for a
domestic audience) and international terror attacks. Therefore we re-run our regressions on
the difference in domestic and international attacks between acquirer and target countries.
Table 32 presents the results from naively estimating the projection of acquisition flows
between the acquirer and target country on the relative difference in terrorism using OLS.
The first column reveals that a one percent increase in terrorism in the acquiring country
relative to the target country is associated with a 4 percentage decrease in acquisition flows
between acquirer and target countries. As we supplement this univariate specification with
control variables, we see that this result remains statistically significant and the economics
significance becomes larger.
In Table 33, we present results when we use our instrument variables to control for pos-
sible endogeneity between acquisition flows and relative difference in terrorism and account
for the multiplicative theoretical specification of the gravity equation. Again we show a con-
sistently statistically significant and negative sign for our variable of interest. When we ac-
count for the correct model specification, we now see that we fail to reject the null that the
instruments are valid.
Table 34 presents the results from naively estimating the projection of acquisition flows
between the acquirer and target country on the relative difference in terrorism using OLS.
The first column reveals that a one percent increase in terrorism in the acquiring country
relative to the target country is associated with a 25 percentage decrease in acquisition flows
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between acquirer and target countries. As we supplement this univariate specification with
control variables, we see that this result remains statistically significant and the economics
significance becomes larger.
In Table 35, we present results when we use our instrument variables to control for pos-
sible endogeneity between acquisition flows and relative difference in terrorism and account
for the multiplicative theoretical specification of the gravity equation. Again we show a con-
sistently statistically significant and negative sign for our variable of interest.
Overall our results show that there is a consistently negative and significant sign for both
domestic terrorism and international terrorism
3.6 Conclusion
The shocks of recent attacks have raised the specter of negative economic effects. Our essay
studies the impact that terrorism has on cross-border merger and acquisition initiation. We
develop a simple model to explain the equilibrium acquisition flows and generate predic-
tions of the effect of terrorist attacks. Our model predicts that higher levels of terrorism in
the acquirer (target) country are associated with smaller (larger) acquisition flows. To em-
pirically test this prediction, we exploit the plausibly exogenous variation induced by ethnic
and religious fractionalization and genetic diversity.
Our empirical results consistently show that a smaller the number of terrorist attacks in
the acquirer relative to the target country, there are 9% more acquisition flows between the
target and acquirer. Our robustness tests uphold the plausibility of the exclusion restriction.
We also test the differential impact that domestic and transnational terrorism have on acqui-
sition flows. Both have a negative and significant impact on acquisition flows. However, the
economic significance is larger for transnational attacks relative to domestic terrorist attacks.
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Figure 7: Temporal Distribution of Total Terrorist Attacks. This figure plots the natural log of
the total number of terrorist attacks starting from 1970 until the end of 2015.
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Figure 8: Spatial Distribution of Terrorist Attacks. The lines, or edges, between the country
pairs are based on the number of completed acquisitions. The larger the width of the edge,
the larger the total number of acquisitions between the countries and vice-versa. The size
of the node of each country is based on a measure of importance known as Authority. The
intensity of the color indicates the importance of the country to the overall networkmeasured
by the Betweenness Centrality. Reads: The network of countries which complete cross-border
acquisitions is dominated by a few ‘countries.
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Figure 9: Spatial Distribution of Differential Terrorist Attacks. We graph difference between
the log number of domestic terror attacks and the log number of transnational/international
terror attacks.
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Table 26: Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Variables of Interest
Initiationi j 5,852 1.316 2.805 0.002 58.602
Terrorismi− j 5,852 0.000 2.033 −5.051 5.051
Instrumental Variables
Ethnic Fract. j−i 5,852 0.000 0.348 −0.847 0.847
Religious Fract. j−i 5,852 0.000 0.339 −0.857 0.857
Genetic Dist. j−i 5,700 0.000 0.118 −0.291 0.291
Control Variables
GDP j−i 5,700 0.000 1.619 −4.819 4.819
Distance j−i 5,852 8.681 0.888 4.394 9.892
Contiguity j−i 5,852 0.026 0.158 0.000 1.000
Language j−i 5,852 0.128 0.334 0.000 1.000
Colonial j−i 5,852 0.022 0.146 0.000 1.000
Landlocked j−i 5,852 0.182 0.404 0.000 2.000
Legal System j−i 5,852 0.706 0.456 0.000 1.000
Financial System j−i 4,290 0.000 1.823 −5.950 5.950
Religion j−i 5,852 0.444 0.497 0.000 1.000
Culture j−i 4,032 2.003 1.146 0.071 7.362
Institutions j−i 5,852 1.960 1.976 0.000 11.910
Notes — This table presents the summary statistics of the data used in our regression analysis. Our data set
is composed of matrices of (77×76 = 5,852) ordered country pairs. Our sample drops to a low of (58×57 =
3,306) in some regressions because of limited data for the control variables and instrumental variables.
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Table 27: Correlation Table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(1) 1.000
(2) −0.035* 1.000
(3) −0.046* 0.946* 1.000
(4) 0.023 0.791* 0.683* 1.000
(5) −0.061* 0.148* 0.212*−0.008 1.000
(6) 0.066*−0.123*−0.128*−0.066* 0.232* 1.000
(7) 0.036*−0.246*−0.268*−0.109*−0.100*−0.008 1.000
(8) 0.155*−0.350*−0.407*−0.112*−0.510*−0.031 −0.080* 1.000
(9) −0.280* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
(10) 0.315* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.404* 1.000
(11) 0.213* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.057* 0.163* 1.000
(12) 0.156* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.073* 0.116* 0.146* 1.000
(13) 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.216* 0.075*−0.006 −0.004 1.000
(14) −0.108* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084*−0.143*−0.352*−0.095* 0.108* 1.000
(15) 0.183*−0.230*−0.309*−0.047*−0.260* 0.102* 0.063* 0.646* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
(16) −0.139* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.224*−0.112*−0.020 −0.069*−0.157* 0.004 0.000 1.000
(17) −0.152* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.205*−0.154*−0.148*−0.050*−0.027 0.237* 0.000 0.083* 1.000
(18) −0.119* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.189*−0.115*−0.017 −0.007 0.007 0.068* 0.000 −0.041* 0.379* 1.000
(1) Initiationi j (10) Contiguity j−i
(2) Terrorismi− j (11) Language j−i
(3) Domestic Terrorismi− j (12) Colonial j−i
(4) International Terrorismi− j (13) Landlocked j−i
(5) Ethnic Fract. j−i (14) Legal System j−i
(6) Religious Fract. j−i (15) Financial System j−i
(7) Genetic Dist. j−i (16) Religion j−i
(8) GDP j−i (17) Culture j−i
(9) Distance j−i (18) Institutions j−i
This table presents the correlation matrix between our dependent and independent variables of interest. Significance at 5% is denoted by (*).
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Table 28: Cross-sectional Relationship between Initiations and Terrorism:
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorismi− j −0.084*** −0.125*** −0.125*** −0.140***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018)
GDPi −0.970*** −0.460*** −0.438***
(0.092) (0.070) (0.075)
GDP j −0.141*** −0.076* −0.032
(0.026) (0.042) (0.050)
Distance j−i 0.367*** 0.421*** 0.514***
(0.034) (0.046) (0.056)
Contiguity j−i 6.169*** 6.643***
(0.895) (0.989)
Language j−i 1.099*** 1.462***
(0.263) (0.344)
Colonial j−i 0.646 0.647
(0.708) (0.776)
Landlocked j−i −0.564*** −0.694***
(0.107) (0.127)
Legal System j−i −0.477*** −0.409***
(0.106) (0.124)
Financial System j−i −0.032 −0.026
(0.022) (0.025)
Religion j−i −0.194** −0.086
(0.081) (0.091)
Culture j−i −0.319***
(0.052)
Institutions j−i −0.002
(0.022)
Constant 1.316*** 7.704*** 2.362** 1.495
(0.044) (0.919) (1.029) (1.136)
Obs. 5,852 5,700 4,290 3,306
adj. R2 0.004 0.131 0.275 0.317
Notes — This table presents the results from OLS estimations of the relationship be-
tween initiation flows and the difference between acquiror and target countries in ter-
rorism. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics clustered on the acquirer-target pair are
reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** are used to indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Cross-sectional Relationship between Initiations and Terrorism: PPML
Table 29: ]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorismi− j −0.390*** −0.245*** −0.111*** −0.092***
(0.074) (0.038) (0.016) (0.013)
GDPi −0.203*** −0.124*** −0.080***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
GDP j 0.250*** 0.251*** 0.291***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Distance j−i 0.200*** 0.262*** 0.287***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Contiguity j−i 0.480*** 0.466***
(0.066) (0.065)
Language j−i 0.425*** 0.475***
(0.043) (0.047)
Colonial j−i 0.331*** 0.294***
(0.090) (0.080)
Landlocked j−i −0.130*** −0.154***
(0.028) (0.029)
Legal System j−i −0.067** −0.030
(0.031) (0.034)
Financial System j−i 0.061*** 0.064***
(0.006) (0.006)
Religion j−i 0.048* 0.111***
(0.026) (0.029)
Culture j−i −0.110***
(0.013)
Institutions j−i −0.005
(0.007)
Constant 0.664*** −1.907*** −3.317*** −4.070***
(0.115) (0.214) (0.218) (0.223)
Obs. 5,700 5,700 4,290 3,306
Pseudo-R2 0.000 0.161 0.327 0.373
J-stat p-value 0.265 0.671 0.405 0.128
Notes — This table presents the results from Poisson pseudo-maximum liklihood (ppml) regressions of the
multiplicative relationship between initiation flows and the difference between acquiror and target countries
in terrorism. To address endogeneity concerns, we instrument the difference in terrorism using the difference
in the index of ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and genetic distence. The Sargen-Hansen
J-test of overidentifying restrictions assesses the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, or un-
correlated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated
equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared (χ2) in the number of overidentifying
restrictions. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics
clustered on the target country are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 30: Falsification Test of the Exclusion Restriction: OLS Re-
gressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic Fract. j−i 0.685*** 0.093 0.058 0.074
(0.246) (0.275) (0.318) (0.359)
Religious Fract. j−i −0.654*** −0.664*** −0.584** −0.552*
(0.241) (0.229) (0.259) (0.288)
Genetic Dist. j−i 1.231* 0.975 1.874** 2.056*
(0.725) (0.689) (0.893) (1.224)
Distance j−i −0.866*** −0.505*** −0.519***
(0.075) (0.096) (0.104)
GDPi −0.150** −0.058 −0.033
(0.073) (0.104) (0.118)
GDP j 0.296*** 0.392*** 0.386***
(0.073) (0.104) (0.118)
Contiguity j−i 4.409*** 4.896***
(0.551) (0.589)
Language j−i 0.901*** 0.696**
(0.285) (0.315)
Colonial j−i 2.468*** 2.249***
(0.697) (0.696)
Landlocked j−i −0.588*** −0.713***
(0.180) (0.194)
Legal System j−i −1.075*** −1.009***
(0.220) (0.249)
Financial System j−i 0.017 0.032
(0.058) (0.062)
Religion j−i −0.358* −0.291
(0.188) (0.222)
Culture j−i −0.394***
(0.105)
Institutions j−i −0.049
(0.065)
Constant 1.367*** 7.394*** 3.397** 4.192**
(0.079) (1.220) (1.504) (1.636)
Obs. 1,468 1,468 1,128 888
adj. R2 0.008 0.110 0.218 0.274
Notes — This table presents the results from OLS estimations of the rela-
tionship between initiation flows and our instruments for a subsample that
has low differences in terrorism between the acquirer and target countries.
If the instruments have a first-order effect on our dependent variable and
hence violate the exclusion restriction, then the coefficients should signifi-
cant. The instruments are the difference in terrorism using the difference in
the index of ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and genetic
distance. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics clustered on the acquirer-
target pair are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** are used
to indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 31: Falsification Test of the Exclusion Restriction: PPML
Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic Fract. j−i −0.141* 0.056 0.042 0.033
(0.075) (0.063) (0.067) (0.070)
Religious Fract. j−i 0.096 0.132*** 0.084* 0.088
(0.071) (0.049) (0.051) (0.055)
Genetic Dist. j−i 0.035 0.241 0.170 0.370
(0.232) (0.152) (0.170) (0.232)
Distance j−i −0.163*** −0.080*** −0.046**
(0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
GDPi 0.334*** 0.317*** 0.339***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
GDP j 0.152*** 0.217*** 0.222***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020)
Contiguity j−i 0.428*** 0.439***
(0.081) (0.071)
Language j−i 0.288*** 0.260***
(0.054) (0.057)
Colonial j−i 0.575*** 0.477***
(0.121) (0.108)
Landlocked j−i −0.077** −0.078**
(0.031) (0.033)
Legal System j−i −0.175*** −0.161***
(0.048) (0.054)
Financial System j−i 0.059*** 0.064***
(0.011) (0.012)
Religion j−i −0.090** −0.060
(0.038) (0.044)
Culture j−i −0.075***
(0.019)
Institutions j−i −0.024**
(0.012)
Constant 0.391*** −2.796*** −3.836*** −4.147***
(0.024) (0.241) (0.273) (0.278)
Obs. 1,468 1,468 1,128 888
Pseudo-R2 0.003 0.394 0.447 0.473
Notes — This table presents the results from Poisson pseudo-maximum lik-
lihood (ppml) regressions of the multiplicative relationship between initi-
ation flows and our instruments for a subsample that has low differences
in terrorism between the acquirer and target countries. If the instruments
have a first-order effect on our dependent variable and hence violate the
exclusion restriction, then the coefficients should significant. The instru-
ments are the difference in terrorism using the difference in the index of
ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and genetic distance.
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics clustered on the target country are re-
ported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
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Table 32: Domestic Terrorism Subsample: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic Terr.i− j 0.008 −0.018*** −0.035*** −0.038***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
GDPi −0.970*** −0.460*** −0.438***
(0.092) (0.070) (0.075)
GDP j −0.128*** −0.062 −0.012
(0.027) (0.045) (0.053)
Distance j−i 0.354*** 0.408*** 0.494***
(0.033) (0.045) (0.053)
Contiguity j−i 6.169*** 6.643***
(0.895) (0.989)
Language j−i 1.099*** 1.462***
(0.263) (0.344)
Colonial j−i 0.646 0.647
(0.708) (0.776)
Landlocked j−i −0.564*** −0.694***
(0.107) (0.127)
Legal System j−i −0.477*** −0.409***
(0.106) (0.124)
Financial System j−i −0.042* −0.034
(0.022) (0.025)
Religion j−i −0.194** −0.086
(0.081) (0.091)
Culture j−i −0.319***
(0.052)
Institutions j−i −0.002
(0.022)
Constant 1.316*** 7.704*** 2.362** 1.495
(0.044) (0.919) (1.029) (1.136)
Obs. 5,852 5,700 4,290 3,306
adj. R2 0.000 0.125 0.271 0.314
Notes — This table presents the results from OLS estimations of the relationship be-
tween initiation flows and the difference between acquiror and target countries in do-
mestic terrorism. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics clustered on the acquirer-target
pair are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** are used to indicate signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 33: Domestic Terrorism Subsample: PPML Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic Terr.i− j −0.038*** −0.031*** −0.029*** −0.033***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
GDPi −0.204*** −0.128*** −0.086***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
GDP j 0.271*** 0.263*** 0.293***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Distance j−i 0.193*** 0.257*** 0.290***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
Contiguity j−i 0.458*** 0.449***
(0.066) (0.066)
Language j−i 0.427*** 0.474***
(0.042) (0.046)
Colonial j−i 0.341*** 0.305***
(0.090) (0.080)
Landlocked j−i −0.123*** −0.147***
(0.027) (0.028)
Legal System j−i −0.072** −0.028
(0.030) (0.034)
Financial System j−i 0.061*** 0.064***
(0.006) (0.007)
Religion j−i 0.061** 0.121***
(0.026) (0.029)
Culture j−i −0.108***
(0.013)
Institutions j−i −0.006
(0.007)
Constant 0.382*** −2.146*** −3.357*** −4.080***
(0.017) (0.182) (0.214) (0.221)
Obs. 5,700 5,700 4,290 3,306
Pseudo-R2 0.001 0.307 0.343 0.365
J-stat p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes — This table presents the results from Poisson pseudo-maximum liklihood (ppml) regressions of the
multiplicative relationship between initiation flows and the difference between acquiror and target countries
in domestic terrorism. To address endogeneity concerns, we instrument the difference in terrorism using the
difference in the index of ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and genetic distence. The Sargen-
Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions assesses the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, or
uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated
equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared (χ2) in the number of overidentifying
restrictions. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics
clustered on the target country are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 34: International Terrorism Subsample: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Int. Terrorismi− j −0.138*** −0.117*** −0.197*** −0.249***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.030)
GDPi −0.970*** −0.460*** −0.438***
(0.092) (0.070) (0.075)
GDP j −0.090*** −0.051 0.004
(0.028) (0.044) (0.052)
Distance j−i 0.316*** 0.396*** 0.478***
(0.031) (0.045) (0.054)
Contiguity j−i 6.169*** 6.643***
(0.895) (0.989)
Language j−i 1.099*** 1.462***
(0.263) (0.344)
Colonial j−i 0.646 0.647
(0.708) (0.776)
Landlocked j−i −0.564*** −0.694***
(0.107) (0.127)
Legal System j−i −0.477*** −0.409***
(0.106) (0.124)
Financial System j−i −0.025 −0.021
(0.021) (0.024)
Religion j−i −0.194** −0.086
(0.081) (0.091)
Culture j−i −0.319***
(0.052)
Institutions j−i −0.002
(0.022)
Constant 1.316*** 7.704*** 2.362** 1.495
(0.044) (0.919) (1.029) (1.136)
Obs. 5,852 5,700 4,290 3,306
adj. R2 0.010 0.131 0.278 0.323
Notes — This table presents the results from OLS estimations of the relationship be-
tween initiation flows and the difference between acquiror and target countries in in-
ternational terrorism. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics clustered on the acquirer-
target pair are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** are used to indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
102
Table 35: International Terrorism Subsample: PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Int. Terrorismi− j −0.038*** −0.031*** −0.029*** −0.033***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
GDPi −0.204*** −0.128*** −0.086***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
GDP j 0.271*** 0.263*** 0.293***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Distance j−i 0.193*** 0.257*** 0.290***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
Contiguity j−i 0.458*** 0.449***
(0.066) (0.066)
Language j−i 0.427*** 0.474***
(0.042) (0.046)
Colonial j−i 0.341*** 0.305***
(0.090) (0.080)
Landlocked j−i −0.123*** −0.147***
(0.027) (0.028)
Legal System j−i −0.072** −0.028
(0.030) (0.034)
Financial System j−i 0.061*** 0.064***
(0.006) (0.007)
Religion j−i 0.061** 0.121***
(0.026) (0.029)
Culture j−i −0.108***
(0.013)
Institutions j−i −0.006
(0.007)
Constant 0.382*** −2.146*** −3.357*** −4.080***
(0.017) (0.182) (0.214) (0.221)
Obs. 5,700 5,700 4,290 3,306
Pseudo-R2 0.001 0.307 0.343 0.365
J-stat p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes — This table presents the results from Poisson pseudo-maximum liklihood (ppml) regressions of the
multiplicative relationship between initiation flows and the difference between acquiror and target countries
in international terrorism. To address endogeneity concerns, we instrument the difference in terrorism using
the difference in the index of ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and genetic distance. The
Sargen-Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions assesses the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are
valid, or uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the
estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared (χ2) in the number of overi-
dentifying restrictions. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. Heteroskedasticity-robust
t-statistics clustered on the target country are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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